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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

ST.A.TE

OF UTAH

STATE OF l . . T.A.H,
Pl.aintz~ff

a;nd Re8pondent.

CASE

\S.

E. B. ERWIX. HAR.RY FIKCH and
R. 0. PE..lliCE.
Defendants and .A.ppellants.

NO. 6200

BRIEF OF APPELLANT E. B. ERWIN
STATE~EXT

OF CASE

Th~

grand jury of Salt Lake County returned an
indictment accusing E. B. Erwin, Harry Finch, Frank
A. Thacker (who 'Ya=' acquitted), R. 0. Pearce and Ben
Harmon (now deceased) of thB crime of criminal conspiracy in violation of 103-11-1 R. S. 1933. Unless otherwise indica ted it:alics are supplied.
The grand jury found :
The grand jurors . . . accuse E. B. Erwin
... Df the crime of criminal conspiracy . . . committed as follows:
. . . the said E. B. Erwin (and others)
... on the 6th day of January, 1936, and
on ~divers other days and times between that day
and the first day of January, 1938, did .
agree, combine, cons.piTe, confederate, and enSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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gage to ... commit acts injurious to public morals and fqr.the perversion and obstruction of jus'tice a;nd the due administration of the laws of
... Utah, to-wit:

. . . the s1a:id E. B. Erwin (and others) . . . did
. . . agree, .combine, conspire·, confederate, and
engage to . . . permi,t, allow, as~sris·t, and enruble
···houses of ill fame ... and lotteries, dice g-ames,
· slot machines, book making, and other gambling
devices and games o.f chance (card and poker
' games ~are not mentioned in indictment) to ibe
kept, maintained, and ope~rated at various
places in Salt Lake City . . . the said defendant's then and there weU knowing that s~aid . . .
· · · (place,s) were being kept, maintaine~ and op1·
.erated in . . . Salt Lake City in violation of
( la-'v) . . . and in furtheDance of said conspiracy
did ·commit the following overt acts :
1. . . . between March 15, 1936, and J,a.nuary 1, 1938, the ... defendants permitted, allowed,
assis,ted and enabled house·s. of ill fame ... to
:be kept, maintained and operated at van·ous
pl,aces in Salt Lake City ...
2. . . . between ( sam·e date's) the . . . de. fendants permitted, allowed, assisted and ena,bled lotteries, dice game·s, slot machines, and
book making and other games of chance and
gambling devices to be kept . . . at various
places in Salt Lake City....
3. That on or about the 1~s·t day of each .. ·
month between . . . June, 1937, .and January,
1938 . . . t·he defendants ooll·e~cted money from
· · the operators of various houses of ill fame in
various places in iSal t Lake City . . .
4. That at various times hetiWeen April 1,
1936, ~a.nd January .1, 1938, the defendants colSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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lected and c-aused to be collected 1noney from
the operators of various lot~terie's, dice games,
slot machines. book-making, and other gamos of
chance and gambling devices at various places
in Salt Lake City . . . contrary to . . . statutes
... of Utah ..
Ca.rl ,,.... . Buehner, Forem·an.
Endorsed ''A True Bill'', ·Carl W. Buehner,
Foreman.

**STA..TE)fEXT OF FACTS
The conspiracy is alleged to have commenced at the
time Mr. Erwin was sworn in as mayor (2! months before Mr. Finch became chief of police) and ended the
1st day of January, 1938.
None of the defendants was an operator of any of
the houses of vice mentioned.
The only money paid by the underworld was paid
to (1) Abe Stubeck (774 and 787) and (2) Golden Holt
(970).
None of the money collected was ever paid to Mr.
Erwin. Money collected in 1936 was paid to Abe Rosenblum. Money collected in 1937 was paid to Ben Harmon
(now deceased).
The overt acts consist of:

1. and 2. Permitted houses of vice to remain open.
3. and 4. Collecting ~oney from houses of
VICe.

**Unless · otherwlise indi.ooted the figirures in parentheses refer to
lpages of the record. The .record is£<> voluliDJinous tlla;t we concluded
it ;would be more :SaJtislfaotory to the court to refer only to irOOOrd
pages :rather than .to xecord and abstract and •supplemental aJb'S'traet pages.
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The alleged ·conspirators were not related to each
other nor we-re they clUib, poli ti~cal, fl'laternal, social, religious or p~rofessional friends. None of them were in
hu·sinHss together.
Mr. Erwin was elected mayor of Salt Lake City
in the eleetion of 1935 and was sworn in office in January, 1936. He was assigned to the dep1artment of public
safety.
Mr. Finch h3Jd been in business in ;Salt Lake City for
up>Wards of forty-five years, had been a eity commissioner f:or ten. years (1510). In the above et:ection he
supported Mr. Erwin's opponent. He met Mr. Erwin
aft~eT the primary in 1g.35 in Mr. A. 8. Brown's office (1512). Mr. Finch was known favorab[y ib~ gTeat
groups of per.sorrs in the· city 1an:d by the City Conmrission. In February, 1936, he was nominated for chief
of police by Mr. Erwin and was appointed by the city
coiilllllsslon. The appointment took effect March 15,
1936.
Mr. Pearce is an attorney and Wlas the atton1ey
for Mr. Harmon. On one occasion he us1ed Mr. Erwin
as -a witness in a city court ease which was filed in 1934.
Mr. Erwin was not a party to .that suit.

Mr. Thacker had ,he·en a police officer for many
year.s. He w·as acqu.itted of being a conspirator in this
action.

Mr. Hannon is dleceased. There is no evidence that
he ~nd Mr. Erwin were aeqUlainted with each other. Mr.
Harmon .and Mr. Finch were a-cquainted and in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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past had been eompetitors in the rPstauraJlt

bns.ine~ss.

There is no eYidence that Mr. Erwin (or ·any other
defendant for that Inatter) r.onspired or agreed with
any other person to do the thing~ alleg~l in the indictment 'Or to do the things alleged by Mr. Romney in the
bill of particulars. (~ore ,n.n be sajd about the ibill of
particulars later).
There is no evidence that Mr. Erwin ever knew the
witness Stubeck. Witness Holt was a police officer who
had been connected mth prostitution in this city for
many years and was the recipient of money and am
O'vercoat fronz prosti-tutes (940). He had been present
on one occasi{)n during a conference when Mr. Erwin
was present.
There Wtas no evidence of an agreement. The state
does n-ot contend there was any direct evidence of an
agreement. The court so instructed the jury in instruction No. 7 (Ab. 264). To sustain the charge of agreement we must search for indirect or circumstantial evidence which supports the charge. There is no such evidence.
So far as Mr. Erwin is concerned the circumstantial evidence on agreement is a follows :
1. The witness Kempner testified that as he went
with the witness ·Stubeck (and this is •all denied by Stubook) while Stubeck collected money from various persons in poo1 halls and at certain card games Stubeek
told Kempner that he, Stubeck, collected the money and
took it over to Ben Harmon who split it ''with Erwin
and his crowd" (787).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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2. The witness 0. B. Record testified that Mr.
Pearce had told him that the mayor wanted a collection
nllade.
3. The witnesses Smith, Early, Pricharu and
Runzler testified that Mr. Er,vin had been infomned by
then1 or others that a pay-off was being .conducted. No
one testified as to the existence of any ~agreement.
4. The 'vitness Hunsaker testified that Mr. Er,vin
paid him in ·currency on a note Mr. Erwin o'ved Mr.
Hunsaker; took receipts for this currency; sometimes
paid by check or money order, and made payments to
M·rs. Hunsaker, her son, Clifford Huns1aker, and at least
once to a Miss Stone.
Houses ·of prostitution have been operat,ed in Salt
I jake City since long before January 6, 1936, and subs·equent to January 1, 1938, .and prostitutes f.or many
years have been, were and are being periodically examined (once every two we-eks) to ~ascertain if they are
diseased, allJd, if they are not, they go back to their
weHknown houses and practice p:vostitution.
I_jot,teries, dice gan1·es, slot machines, bookmaking
anEl other games of chance had operated in the city since
prior to 1913 with f.eV\r, if any, molestations.
If this case is not decided on the questions of l'aw,
as we think it should, we apprehend the court will read
the five volumes of reeord. The facts will further appear as we proceed.

STATEMEN·T OF ERRORS RELIED UP·ON
1. Failure of the court to quash the indi·ctment. (Assignments 1 & 5).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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•> Insufficit:•nt accusation contained in the
inilictment. ( ~\~~ig1llllen v~ 2, 4 & 6).

3. Failure of the court to require the state
to elect 'Yhieh ~nibdiYi~ion of 103-11-1 R. S. 1933
it would proceed under (Assignment 6).

4. Fajlure of the court to grant appellant's
motion for non suit and dismissal. (Astsignment 7).
5. Failure of the court to gTant appell1ant's
motion for a directed \ermct. (As·signment 8).
6. 'T·hat the verdict is against and not supported by the evidence. (Assignments 10 & 18).
7. Failure of the court to grant a.pp·ellant
a fair trial (Assignments 9, 11, 12, 13 & 19).
8. The oourt received incompetent, irrelevant a.nd immaterial evidence. (Assignments 14
& 15).
9. The court gave improper instructions to
jury. (Assignments 17 & 24).
10. The court failed to properly instruct
the jury (Assignment 20).
11. Failure of the oourt to gmnt the motion in arrest of judgment. (Assignment 21).
12. Failure of the court to grant appellant's motion for a new trial (Assignment 22).

STATEMENT OF P ARTICUI.JAR Q·UESTIONS INV~OLVED
I.

The copy of the indictment returned by
the grand jury and furnished defendant pursuant
to the requirements· o.f Section 12, Ar1jcle I. of
the Constitution of Utah, and 105-5-8 (2) R. S.
1933 did not, and does not contain the nature and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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caus~e

of tthe 18JCcusation against him. :The indictment cannot be cured by a bill of particulars.
II. Insufficiency of the evidence to support
thH verdict of the jury.
III. Erroneous ~admissions of evidence.

IV. ·The instrnetionis of the court were such
as. to p·ermit the jury to s.pe-culate on its verdict.
V. Appellant's
reques~ted
instructions
should have be~en grr-anted in the particulars hereinaf,ter set out.
VI. Appellant was placed twice in jeopardy for the s~ame o.ffens:e.
VII.

Improper

~conduct

of district attor-

ney.

ARGUMENT

IN~SUFFl!CIENCY

·OF IND·IOT·MENT

I.
Under Section 12, Article I. of the Constitution of
Utah, and 105-1-8 (2) R. S. 1933, the accused is guaranteed the right to demand the nature and oause of the
accusation against him, and to have supplied to him a
copy of the indictment contairning such accusa.tion.
At the first opportunity .availaib~e to him after the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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grand jury returned its indiet.Inent, appellant n1oved to
quash the indictment on nutuerou~ grounrds, (roo. 8, ab.
±) one of "~hich grounds "~n ~ that it did not allege
facts ""hich shlnY~i the naturl~ and ea use of the accusation against him as is gnaTantee-d and required by the
aforementioned eonstitutiona1 and statutory provisions.
(This statute ·was not repealed by the Code of Criminal
Proc-edure adopted in 1935, nor by Chapter 143, Laws
of lTtah 1931, <>r by any other amendment or statute).
The motion to quash the indictment "~as denied.
Defendant thereupon "~as required to plead to the indictment. The indictment as returned by the grand jury
-was obviously insufficient and inadequate. Acting under
the coercion of the circumstances and without in any
manner waiving his motion to quash, Mr. Erwin demanded a bill of particrnars.
The insufficiency of the indictment as returned by
the grand jury was conceded by the court and tby the
state. It \\as wholly inadequate and insufficient to require defendants to plead. For that reason the ·court
granted defendants' request for a bill of particulars
and required the state to furnish 'a bill
particularizing upon the all'eged means employed
by the defendants to permit, allow, assist and
enable hous-es of ill fame, lotteries, dice games,
slot machines and various gambling devices and
games of chance to he opev.ated and. maintained
-at various places in Salt Lake City ; and I shall
further require the State to particularize in re~spect to the location of the houses of ill fame referred to in the indictment and in the overt act
·s~t forth in the indictment, and the names of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ope,rrutors ·of those VJarious houses of ill fame
referred to. I Sihall further require the State to
particularize in resp·ect to the location of and the
10pe~rators of rthe lottery ~estalblishmenJts and
the dice game e·stablishments and the bookmaking ·establishments, and. in respect to the opera tors of the slot machines, and ~also to particularize, if they intend to rely upon other games
of chance ·or gambling devices, as t·o what those
gambling devices are and who operate them and
where they are mainfained in Salt Lake City.
I .s:hall further require the State to particularize. in respect to the location of the various
houses of ill fame, and the operators thereof
from whom allegedly ·money 'vas ·collected, and
who ·colle-cted it, if anyone, and the same in re~spect to the location of and the operators of
the various lotteries, diee games, slot machines
and bookmaking e·stablishments referred to in
the indictment. ( Rec. 37, 1a.b. 6)
Thereupon a bill of particulars was furnished by
Marion G. Ron1ney, Deputy District Attorney (Rec. 39,
Ab. 7).

. The bill of particulars contains the names and ·addresses of fourteen operators of houses of ill fame;
the names and addresses of five opera tors of lotteries ; the names 1a.nd addresses of three operators of dice
games; the names and addresses of six bookmaking estahlishnle:n ts ; and the names and addresses of ten
places where poker games were kept, maintained and
operated. (Poker games are not mentioned in the indictment). 'T he deputy district attorney, and nO't the
1
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grand jurors, interprett"d th~ Janguag·p of the inrd,ictment •'18D.d other gan1bling dPYiee~ and p;a1nes of
chanc-e'' to mean pokt"r g·nme~.

The bill of particular5 then
the defendants

nllege~

( nb. 10) that

permitted~

allo"'"ed, a~5i5lte·d, and enc.vbled houses
of ill fame. resorted. to for purposes of prostitu-

tion and lewdness. lotteries, dice games, slot machines, bookmaking and other games of chance
and oth-er gambling devices to be kept, maintained and opera.ted at the places herein m·entioned in Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, by then and there failing and refu.sin.g to nu1.ke arrests for the keeping, mwintain-ing, and operating of said places, although
the said defendants he·rein well knew that said
places zcere being kept, maintained and operated =~= * * and said defendants further permitted, allowed, assisted and enabled said places to
be kept, maintained and operated by failing and
refusing to enforce the statutes of the State of
Utah Olfl,d the ordinances of Salt Lake City prohibiting the keeping, maintaining and operating of said places and said games.
The deputy district attorney then alleges in the
bill. of particulars that the defendants
with the aid and assistance of Golden Holt and
Ben Harmon, collected money from the ope,rators of the houses of ill fame * * *
and that the ·defendants :
with the aid and assistanee of Ben Harmon, and
other persons to the State of U~tah unknown, collected money from the operators of the lotte·ries,
dice games, ibookmaking, and other games of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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·chance and gambling devices herein referred~ to
.and set out. (It was. under the ·above words. ''and
other g1ames of chance and ·gambling devices"
that the ·court let in all of the evidence concerning poker games. Poker games are not men'tioned in: the· indictment.)
T.hereupon, motions were mtade 'by each defendant
to quash the indictment as supplemented by the bill of
parti·culars upon all of the .grounds of .the previous
~otions to quash .and upon the further grounds: (1)
that the hill ·of particmlars did not conform to the
court's order, ( 2) that the indictment returned by the
grand jury cannot be .supplemented or augmented by
a bill of particulars furnished by the deputy district
attorney, and on other grounds contained. in said motions~. ( Re·c. 42, a h. 11)
Motions were made to strike the bill of particulars
and after they were denied the defendants Erwin
and Pearce· pleaded ''not guilty'' .and ''former jeopardy and ta,cquitta[". (Rec. 59, alb. 13).

INDICT ME·NT D·EFINE(D
1

''An indictment is an accusation in writing
presented iby a ·Grand Jury to the· District
Court, charging ;a person with a public off·ense·. ''
105-10-2 R ..s. 19'33.
If the indictment as returned by the grand jury
had :contained the nature and the cause of the accusation against the defendant as required by the Constitutiop. and the statute, the defendant would not have been
entitled to ta bill of particulars, ex·cept, perhaps, to make
it more cert·ain.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The trial court and the state proceeded on the
theory that Ch. 118, St"\C\ 1, La"·s of Ut-ah 1n:~5 (105-219) appliett to an indictm~nt returned by n g·rand jury.
"\\ e confess that the la11g:uagt:~ -of the statute includes
indictments. but obYiously the statute could not amend
the constitution and it "'"as not intended to. Just as
obnously the grand jurors must return the indictment
and no one else.
The above menti{)ned section of the 1935 laws pro-rides that when the indictment

fails to inform the defendant of the particulars
of ·the offense, sufficiently to enable him to prHpare his defense, or to give him such information
as
is entitled to under the Constitution of this
State, the court may, of its own motion, .and shall
at the request of the defendant, order the prosecuting attorney .to furnish a bill of particulars
containing such information as 1nay be necessary
for these purposes; * * * .

he

It cannot be said that the grand jurors found that the
defendants, "permitted, allowed, assisted, and enabled"
the houses of ill fame and lotteries, !bookmaking establishments and poker games referred to in the bill of particulars to be kept, maintained and operated by fali"Wn.g
and refusing to make arrests for the keepimk, maitntaining and operating of said places because, for the simple
reason, no one knows, except the grand jurors, what
places and what reasons the grand jurors had in mind
when they returned the indictment filed in this case.
The grand jurors never fo}llld that Golden Holt
and Ben Harmon collected money from operators of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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houses of ill fame nor that Ben Harmon assisted the
defendants to collect money from the operators of the
gambling place·s. It was the <leputy district attorney who
found those alleged facts. This defendant is entitled
to .an indictment returned by a grand jury which gives
the nature and cause of the accusation without resorting to amy paper or docu1nent or bill of particulars furnished by sorneone else.
Who ean say that when the grand juror~s used the
words "and other g,amibling devices and games of
chance" they meant "poker games" which had been
played at the places and under the operators named in
the bill of particul!ars. The 1nention of the particular
.r;ambli.ng devicPs excludes card games. :
T~he <1eput~~

diRtrict attorney .after setting out the
lotteries, dice ga1nes, bookmaking establishments and
poker gan1es he had in his 1nind uses the words ''and
other games of ·chance and gambling devices'' so that
notvvithstanding he has named. the poker games, someone else .may come along and under that sort of language include other game·s of chance and gambling devices. See last t\vo paragraphs of bill of particulars.
T:he language of our constitutional 1and statutory
provisions concerning the requirements of an indictnlent has received judicial determination in many eases.
A ·defendant is entitled to demand that the indictment
charge the essential facts so specifically that the judgment rHndered \vill be a -complete 1defensH to a second
prosecution for the same offense.
In the case of U. S. v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 23
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L. Ed. 5SS, in diseu~sing- an indichnl\nt for crilniua 1
conspiracy. the court stated ns follo\\Ts:
According to the Yie·\\T we take- of thos·e
oounts the question is not 'Yhe-thl\r it is enough,
in ·~neral, to deseribe a. statutory offense in. the
language of the statute, but "Thether the offens·e
has here ibeen described at all. The ~tatute provides for the puni~hment of those .\vho conspire
•·To injure, oppress. threaten or intimidate any
citizen, mth intent to preYent Or hinder his free
exercise and enjoyment of any right or privilege
granted or sreured to him by the Constitution
or laws of the l~ nited States.'' These counts· in
the indictment charge, in substance, that the intent in this case ''as to 'hinder anJCL prevent
these citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment
of · 'e\ery, each, all and singular'' the rights
granted them by the Constitution, etc. 'Thel"e is
no specification of any particular right. The
language is broad enough to cover ;aJl.
In criminal cases, prosecuted under the laws
of the "Cnited States, the accused has the constitutional right ''to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation. '' Amend. VI. In
"G. S. v. Mills, 7 Pet. 142, this was construed to
mean, that the indictment must set forth the offense ''with clearness and all neces~sary certainty, to apprise the accused of the crime with
which he stands charged;" and in U. '8. v. Cook,
17 Wall. 174, 21 L. ed. 539, that "Every ingredient of which the offense is composed mus;t be
accur.ately and clearly alleged." It is an elementary principle . of ·criminal pleading, that
· where the definition of an1 offens:e, whether it he
'at common law or by :statute, ''includes generic
terms, it is not sufficient that the indictment
shall charge the offense in the same gen·eric terms
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as i!Ill the definition; but it mus:t state the spe·cies;
it must ·des(~end to particulars.. '' 1 Arch. Cr. Pr.
and Pl. 291. ·The· object of the indictment is, first,
to furnish the accus,ed with such a description
of the charge against him as. will enruhle him to
make his defens.e, and 1avail himBelf of his conviction or acquittal for protecti~on, against a further pros·eeution for the same cause; and, s·econd, to inform :the court of the facts :alleged, so
that it may decide whe·the~r they are sufficient in
}.aw to support a ·conviction, if one should he
had. For this., :fa;cts· are· to be s:tated, not conclusionls of law alone. A crime is made up of oots
and intent; and thes'e must he s·et forth in the
indictment, with reaS'onahle p.aTticularity of time,
place anld ·circumstances.
Likewise, Justi·ce Field in the case of U. '8. v. Hess,
124 U. S. 483, 31 L. Ed. 516, stated as follows:
The doctrine invoked by the solicitor-gooie-ra!, that it is :sufficient, in an indictment upon a
s~tatute, to set forth the offens-e in the wo:r.ds of
the statute, does not me·ert the· ·difficulty he-re.
Undoubt.edly the lan:guage of the statute may
be used in the general des:cription o.f an offense·;
but it must be aceomp.ani'ed with ~such a state·ment
of the facts and circumstance's as will inform
the .accus.ed of the specific offens'e, ·coming under
the ge,neral deseription, with which he is eh:arged.
,One- or two ·cas'ers will se.rve 1as an illustration of
the ,doctrine. In United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U. ·S. 542, the ·counts ·of the indictment in general
languagH ·charged the defendant'S with an intent
to ihinder l3.nd prevent ·di ti~ens 1of1the Uni tedl States
of African des-cent named therein, in the free exercise and enjoyment of all t·he rights., privileges,
and immnnitie's, .and pr·oteotion goo.nted and secured to them :r:espective,Iy as citizens of the
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lTnited States and of the State of Louisiana,
because they "-erP persons of Afrie.an descent,
but did not specify a.ny particular right, the enjoyment of "-hich the conspirators intended to
hinder or preYl)ut: and. it 'vas held .that the
aYernnents of the counts "-ere too Vla.gue and
general, and lacked the certainty and precision
required by the esbahlished rules of criminal
pleading, and "·ere there-fore insufficien1t in law.
In speaking of the necessity of g-reater particularity of statem~nt, the court said, p. 558: "It
is an element.ary principle of criminal pleading
that where the definition of an ~offense, whether
it be at common la"- or by statute, inclules generic terms, it is not sufficient thlat the indictment
shall charge the offense in the same generic terms
as in the de:finitio'lll; but it must state the ~spe
cies; it must descend to particulars. 1 .Arch. Cr.
Pr. & Pl. 291. The object of the indictment is:
First, to furnish the accused with such a description of th charge agminst him as will enable him
to m.a.ke his defense, amd avail hi1nself of his conv,ictio'n' or acquittal fo,r protection against a further prosecution for the same cause; and secand, to inform the court of the facts alleged,
so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to swpport a conviction, if one should be
;had. For this, facts are to be stated, not conclusilOns of law aloTIJe. A crime is made up of acts
and intent; and these must be set forth in the
indictment with reasonaJble particularity of
time, place .and circumstances.
Justice Sanborn, in the case of Fontana v. United
States, 262 Fed. 283, says :
The basic principle of English and American jurisprudence is that no man shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process ·of law; 'and notice of the charge or claim
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against hin1, not only sufficient to inform him
that there is. a charge or claim, but ISO distinct
and spe·cific as cl,ea.r ly to advise him what he has
to meet, and to giVJe him a fair and reasonable
oppor~tunity ~to prepare ·his defens,e, is an indispensabl~e ·element of that process. When one is
itn1dicted for a serious oIf ense, the presumption
is that he is irvnocen.t thereof, and consequently
that he is ignorant of the facts on which the
pleader founds his charges, and it is a fundamental rule that the sufficiency of a;n indichnent
rnust be tested on the preswmption that the defendant is inrnocent of it and has no knowledge
of the facts charged against him in the pleading.
MiHer v. Unit~ed State·s, 133 IPed. 337, 341, 66 C.
C. A. 399, 403; N,aftzger v. Unjted Srtates, 200
Fed. 494, 502, 118 C. C. A. 598, 604.
It is essential to the sufficiency of an indict'ntent that it set forth the facts which the pleader clai1ns constitute the alleged transgression,
so distinctly as to a;dvise the accused of the
charge which he has to 1neet, and to give hi1n
a fair opportunity to prepare his defense, so
particularly as to enable hi1n to avail himself of
a conviction or acquittal in defense of another
prosecution for the same offense, am;~d so cle,atrly
that the court ma.y be able to determine whether
or not the facts there stated are sufficient to
support a conviction. United States v. Britton,
107 U. S. 665, 669, 670, 2 ~sup. ~Ct. 512, 27 L. Ed.
520; United Sta~t·es v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 488, 8
Sup. ·Ct. 571, 31 I.J. Ed. 516; Miller v. United
S·tartes, 133 Fed. 337, 341, 66 C. C. A. 399, 403;
Armour Pkg. Co. v. United .St·ates, 153 Fed. 1,
16, 17; 82 C. C. A. 13-5, 150, 151 14 L. R. A. (N.
S.} 400 ; Etheredge v. United ~states, 186 Fed.
434, 108 C. C. A. 3-56; Winters v. United States,
201 Fed. 845, 848, 120 C. C. A. 175, 178; Horn v.
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United States. 182 Fed.
163, 167.
In I.~ynch Y. l~nitPd
court held as follo,vs:

Sba.te~.

7~1, 72~,

105 C. C. A.

10 Fed. (~d) 9~7, the

The defendant in a criminal 0nst), in view
of his presumed innoce'nc.e, is not only -entitled
to know from the statements of the indictment
what facts the prosecution considers sufficient to
make him guilty of the offense charged, with
reason31ble partcularity, so that he may procure
witnesses and make proper defense thereto, but
he is also entitled to denza-nd that the indictment
charge the essent·ial facts so specifically tha~t the
judgment rendered zcill be a complete defense to
a second p·rosecu.t-ion for the same offense.
I'"nited States v. Hess, 124 U. S. 483, 8 S. Ct. 571,
31 L. Ed. 516; ArmQur Packing Oo. v. United
States, 153 F. 1, 82 C. C. A. 135, 14 L. R. A. (N.
S.) 400; Floren v. United States, 186 F. 961, 108
C. C. A. 577.
See also Goldberg v. United States, 277 Fed. 211.
The Supreme Court of Utah, in the case of State v.
Topham, 123 Pac. 888, 41 Utah 39, held as follows :
The doctrine is fundamental, and, as stated
by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S. 29, 16 Sup. Ot.
434, 40 L. Ed. 606, that " the constitutional right
of a defcendant to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him entitles him
to insist, at the 'Outset, by demurrer or by motion to quash, and after verdict, by motion in
arrest of judgment, that the indictment 'Shall
apprise him of the crime charged, with such reasonable certainty that he can make his defense
and protect himself after judgment agairnst anSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

20

other prosecution for the same offense;" and by
Mr. JuSttice Sanborn in Floren v. United 'Btates,
186 F·ed. 961, 108 C. C. A. 577, that "On a motion
in arrest of judgment, a.s well as. on a demurrer,
it ~s essential to the va.lidity of an indictment that
it contain averments of the facts which constitute the offense it charges so certain and specific
that upon conviction. or acquittal thereon it, and
the judgrnent upon it, will constitute a complete
defense to a second prosecution of the defendant for the same oIf ens e." Many ·cases in support
of this !doctrine· are there cited.
1

It is also e.Jrementary and, a,s stated iby the
Miehi~an court in Preople v. Marion, 28 Mich.
257, appl'loved and quoted by this -court in State
v. M·cKenna, 24 Utah, 317, 67 Pac. 815, that, "as
every man is presumed to he innoeent until
proved to he guilty, he must be presumed also
to be ignorant of what is intended to be proved
against him, except as he is informed by the indicement or ilnformation. '' These doctri;Illes are
not he:re· disputed. Our s-tatute is in harmony
with them.
In State v. Lund, 75 Utah 559, 286 Pac. 960, discussing the sufficiency of an information -covering a
statute very similar to the statute uporn which the charge
in this case is founded this -court held:
It ·will he observed that various. acts are declared ·to he felonires tbry ·the p·rovisions of Section 8097, and that diffe.rent penalties are· provided fior a violation of the- va:ri~ous provisions of
that se·ction. T1here is no alle·ga.tion of any fact
in the information here under revie-w which makes
dirHet and certain any one- of the- erim·es. defined
in ~that s;e·ct.ion. It necess,a.rily follows that the
information is fatally defective. 'This ·eonclusion
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finds support in the follo,v-ing: cases decided by
this court: State Y. Mcl(enna., 24 Utah, 317, 67
P. S15: Stat€! Y. ~Topham, 41 Utal1, 39, 123 P. 888;
State Y. Ges:as, 49 r:tah 181, 162 P. 366; State v.
Steele, 67 Utah, 1, 2-!3 P. ~~32; Sta h_} v. Hale
(Utah) 263 P. 86.
From the ea~es cited aboYe it i~ apparent that under our constitution the object of an indictment is twofold: It n1ust. first. furnish the accused 1citlt such a descripti.on of the char,qe agai nsf him as trill enable hi'Yn
to make his defense, and_. second. it nzust be specific
eno·ugh to aL·ail hinz of the right upon conviction or acquittal to protect him a-gainst a further prosecution
for the sanze offense. Even though it is true that certain
crimes may be charged in the words of the statute such
d{)es not apply to statutes where the crime is defined
in general and generic terms.
It is clear from the reading of the statute pleaded
that if ·a perst>n were charged in the terms of the statute he would not kn{nv what sort of a conspi:rtacy he was
charged with, nor if tried for a conspiracy would never
be able to plead the same as a bar to a similar charge
made after either ~a conviction or acquittal.

THE INDICTME~TT WAS NOT AND C·OULD NOT
BE CURIDD BY THE BILL OF P ARTI·CULARS
The nature and cause of the accusation must ibe
contained within the four corners of the indictment.
~he deputy district attorney had no authority to assume to state or to specify the particulars of the offense ~the grand jury intended to charge. No .statement
he might make is binding ~as of record on ·a plea of forSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mer jeopardy. He has no power or control or right to
change the substance of the indictment.
An indictment {~;an be round only on the concurrence of :at least. five grand jurors. 105-20-1, R. S. 1933.
When so found it must be endorsed as a true bill.
The endorsement must be ~igned by the foreman of
the gT.and jury.
The grand jury must be ·Constitutionally formed
and must .act as provided for in the constitution (Art.
1, Sec. 13).

BILL OF PARTICULARS NOT A PART OF T·HE
INDI,CT:MENT
In State vs. Solomam, 93 Utah 70, 71 P!ac. (2d) 104,
this court held that a bill of particul1a.rs is not a part of
the information or indictment. In s~tate vs.. Jessup-----Utah
, 100 Pac. (2d) 969, the court held:
:K'**The function of a bill of particulars is
not that of (~ompelling the· ·defens:e to aid ~the
pros1ecution in stating a cause of ~action. The
burden of stating such .a ea.use re's·ts upon the
shoulders of the prose·cution, ~and until it is. stated to the extent required by our simple form of
criminal pleading·, the question of whether or
not a bill of particul·ars isi prerequisite to further
action on behalf of the accus~ed, has not ·arisen.
Wright v. People (Colo.), 91 Pac. (2d) 499:
The offense set out i;n the hill of p~articulars
appears to he obtaining money :and warrants by
means of false pretenses. It is fundlam·ental that
a de£endant can be- tried only on ~the- charge contained in the indictment, a.Illd not for any other
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offense. '· .A-4 bill of

particular~

is not a part of
an ·i·nd·icftne·nt or i·nfornlafion, nor an a·mend·nte·nt
the,reto. The S'Ole offic~ of tlH"\ bill of particulaJ~s
is to gi\""e tht~ a.dYer~t"\ party infornllati.on 'vllich
the pleadings, by reason of their generality, do
not give. • $ • It ca:nnot chanpe the offense
charged, n.or in a:ny lcay aid an 'ind,ictment
fund.anze-ntally bad, although it may remove an
objection upon the ground of uncertainty.'' 31
C. J. 752, 753; United St·ates Y. :TUJbbs-, D. C., 94
F. 356; May '· United States, 8 Cir., 199 F. 5361.

People '·Westrup (TIL), 25 K. E. (2d) 16:
Hozce~·er,

the indictment, and not the bill of
particulars, i.s the ch01rge upon which the defendant was tried. The only Qbject of the bill of particulars is to give the defendant notice of the
charge against him and to inform him ·of the
particular transactions brought in question so
that he may be prepared to make his defense.
McDonald v. People, 126 lll., 150, 18 N. E. 817, 9
Am. St. Rep. 547. Its ·effect, thereforoe, is to
limit the evidence to the transactions set out in
the bill of particulars. The prosecution, however,
is not required to set out all the evidence it will
produce. The object of a bill of particulars is
not to make a subs.tan tial charge against the defendant, but to limit the evidence which may be
introduced under the indictment to particular
transactions. The indictment, which is the
charge, can neither be helped n~or hurt by the bill
of particulars. People v. Depew, 237 Ill. 574, 86
N. E. 1090.

United States v. Lynch, 11 Fed. (2d) 298:

***Hence all of the averments necess1ary to
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charge an offense must he included and presented by that body, (grand jury) and the district attorney would he without power to supply
any such essentials by 1amendment or through
the medium of a bill of particulars, 31 C. J. p.
650, and authorities in footnote·s.
Jarl v. United States, 19 Fed. (2d) 891, at page 894:
A charge may he good 'and yet it may be
made to appear that in fairne·ss the defendant
should be furnished with ·additional information
to prevent surprise, I"HS triet the proof and thus
enable him to make reaso:nable p·reparration for
hirs defense. It cannot be used to cu-re a;n indictment fatally defective. Furthermore, we do not
know on wha.t rea.son, or by what authority a
District Attorney cam assume to specify the
particular offense the grand jury intends to
charge, nor do we believe a.ny statement he n~ight
make in that respect toould be binding as of record on a plea of former jeopardy. He has no
power of control or right to ch(JJ}1)ge the action
of that body. There are cases in which tha.t practice is appropriate, but the indictmernit must be
good on its face; and that procedure cawnot be
resorted to, with or without the request of defendant, to amend an indictment which is bad
because of a larck of precision, certainly ood accuracy in charging the oIf ens e. This, we think, is
the plain meaning of the ~authoriti,es that have
been ·Ci't'ed, whether the offenser was known at
common law or only statutory and whether it be
a fe~·ony or only :a misd~emeanor. The .reason and
necessity £or the rule apply ra:s much ~to the one
as to the ot·her. The- root's of the· principle ·are
in the eommorn law and we find them imbedded
in the Cons·titution.
1
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ant

,ya.~

chargt"\d "·ith rt'ekle~~ driYing and t hP cbarg·p

"-as merely ~t.ated in g-eneral h\rn1~ of the ~tatute. The
court held:

N-or can the d.eft'Ct be cured by permitting
the ~tate to file a ibill of particulars for the solicitor may not speak for the Grand Jury a;ny
more than he 1nay an1eud an indicfrnent. See
State Y~. Kelly, 66 X. H. 571, 380, 29 A. 843 and
ca5es cited.
See ·al5o the follo,,ing cases :
Thomas YS. State of Maryland, 197 Atl. 296.
Smith \S. State (Florida) 112 .So. 70.
State Ys. Wadford, (N.C.) 139 S. E. 608.
State \S. Gilbert (X. H.) 194 Atl. 728.
10 A. L. R. 982.
Thr~

court ordered the district attorney to furnish
to the defendants the means employed by the defendran:ts to enable the houses of Yice to be operated. That
could not be ~ascertained from the indictment. In response to that, the deputy district attorney alleged
that the defendants enable-d houses of vice to be operated by refusing to make arrests ~and by refusing to
enforce the la \YS of the State -of Utah and the ordlinances of Salt Lake City (Ab. 10).
Does that constitute the nature ~and cause of the
accuS'ation? The grand jury did not so state. Maybe
the gi"a.nd jury found that the defendants. furnished
the facilities which enabled the houses of vice to operate; or furnished the operators of these house:s of
vice money, fixtures, buildings and customers. Arnd,
there is no allegation or proof that houses of vice would
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not continue to be operated even if arrests had been
made. The proof is that prostitution is earried on a.t the
named houses of prostitution and if prostitutes are
driven from those houses, they seatter over the city.
ThJa,t is so, also, of ·card gan1es ·and poker games and
other games. of ehance where a lot of par.aphernalia
is not needed. That is so of !bookmaking.
The bill of particulars said that collections. we1,
1nade with the aid ·and assistance of Golden Holt and
Ben Ha.rmon and other persons unknown to the· deputy
district attorney (Ab. 11). 'The gDand jury did not so
find. And ~this defendant is to be tried on an accusation
of the grand jury.

NO OVERT ACT ALLE·GED
The statute alleged to have been violated:
103-11-1, R. S. 1933.
If two or move persons ·oonspire : ( 1) . . . .
(2) ... (3) ... ( 4) ... ( 5) to -commit any act injurious . . . . to public morals,, . . . . or for the
p·erversion or obstruction of justice or the rdue
administration of the la\YS ;-they arH' punishable
by imp·risonme:n!t in the eounty jail not ·exceeding
one year, or by :fi:ne not exceeding $1,000.
No agreement am·ounts to .a conspiracy unless sotne
act is performed by one of the parties to the agreeInent, which act effeCJts the objeet of the· ,a.greement.
103-11-3, R. S. 1933.
No agreement . . . amounts to a eonspiracy,
unless some act, besides such agreement, is done
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t<> effect the object thereof by one or tnore of
the parti~~ to such agreement.
Upon a trial for conspiraey such a~ is sought io be
alleoo-ed in thi~ c.ase the defendant eannot be convicted,
unless one or more OYert art~ are e:\."'J)ressly alleged in
the indictment and proYed.
,- ')·1 11 . R ..
10u-u--

~
~

. 19·"l·"l
~~.

Upon a trial for conspirncy in a cas·e whel'1e
an O\ert a.ct is nec-essary to constitute the offense, the defendant ~shall not ibe convicted, unless one or m<>re <>vert acts are ·expressly alleged in the . . . indictment, nor unless one of
the acts alleged has been proved; . . .
An overt act is an act done by one or more of the
conspif"ators to effect the object of the agreement. It
must be separate and apa~ from the 1agreement and in
addition to the agreement.
The overt acts sought to be alleged are :
1 and 2:

That the the def·endants permitted
houses of vice to be ~operated.

3 and 4:

That the defendants collected money
from operators of houses of vice.

The first and second overt acts are not ,overt acts
·at all. If anything, they are a part of the agreement.
The agreement is :
The defendants did agree
to permit (houses of
vice) tu operate.

The first two overt acts
1are:
The defendants permitted houses of vice to operate.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

28
The first two overt acis clearly :set forth the same
acts that are alleged to have constituted the agreem·ent.
'The last two overt acts in no way show that money
was ·colle~eted for the purpose of carrying out and with
the intent to ·carry out the 1agreemernt.
The ease of People v. Hines, 6· N. Y. Sup. (2d), 2,
168 Mise. 453, diseussing the ques~tion of overt acts
states:
A number ~of ~aHeg,a:tions are re·cited in the
indictment under the heading ''Overt Acts.'' 'The
only one's affecting defendant Hines are .two
.contained in paragraph 15. ·One is to the effect
that in March, 1932, he met with other;s and
conferred up·on 'and dd.rsrcussed plans to influernce,
intimidate and bribe judicial ~offieers. The other
is that :at the s1ame time he reeeived $1,000 in
cash fflom Dutch Sehultz, one of the eonspirat~
ors. The first "overt act" is really a part of the
conspiracy looking toward action in the future
and is not properly an overt act. The receipt by
Hines of a payment of $1,000 ~cash, aftthough alleged as .an overt act, i's not such, but som·ething
done as a part of the agreement to cemernt the
eonsp1racy.
United States v. Gros:sman, 55 Fed. (2d) 408:

The overt act must be entirely independent
of the conspiracy. It must not 1he one of the series of aets -constituting the agreement, but it
.mus't be a subs·equent indepenCLent :act following
a complete agree;mHnt or conspiracy, 1and done
to ·carry into ·effe~ct the object of the original
agreement.
Marino v. United States, 91 Fed. (2d) 691:
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The crim-e is completed "·hen nn overt act
effe-ct the objer.t of tllf' conspiracy is done hy at
least one of the conspirator~.
An overt·
act is s-omething apart fron1 the conspiracy, amd
is ''an a.ct to effect the object 'Of the conspiracy.''
Joplin Mercantile Co.'· United States, 236 U. S.
531, 535, 35 S. Ct. 291, 293, 59 L. Ed. 705. It
need be neither a criminal a.ct, nor .the very crime
that is the obj.ect of the conspiracy. It mus:t,
h-owe\er, aooompa.n~~ or -follow the agreement,
and must be done in furtherance of the object
of it.
The third and fourth alleged overt 'acts-that the
defendants collected money from operators of houses
of vice, are not acts "done to effect the object (of the
~~eement) by-otze or more of the pa-rties to such agree'ment. '' To collect money from houses of vice does not
enable such houses of vice to operate. If it did, the
more money collected from operators of house of vice
the ibetter enabled such operators would be to operate.
It can't be said thtat to collect money by way of
taxes, tribute, fines or other impositions enables houses
of ill fame to operate.
The state is put in this position. For thirty years
these houses of vice have been opemting. They could
not operate unless collections were made from their
opemtors. Therefore, for thirty years collections have
been made. The state changec11ts theory when it filed its
bill of particulars and, abandomng its alleged overt acts,
took the position that the houses of vice were enabled to
operate because defendants failed and refused to make
arrests. But there is no ~allegation or proof that, the
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£ailure to make arrests· is the thing that enables. houses
of vice to operate. If tha,t were so, it would be simple
to rid the ·city of houses ·of vice and it is known from
the record in this case and the court has judicial knowledge that houses of vice are not so e1asily suppressed.

The Ht:ate was required to prove an wet done by one
or more of the alleged conspirators to effect the object
of an agreement proved to have been entered into iby
this defendant. 'T·he only money collected was collected
by Abe Stubeck (774 a:nd 787) .and Golden Holt (970).
This money was delivered to Abe Rosenblum (967);
someone in the Mint c~afe (787); Ben Harmon (937);
and on. one occasion ~1r. Holt gave approximately
$500.00 to Mr. P·earce in the presence of Mr. Harmon.
at .a time \\rhen Mr. Pearce was Mr. Harmon's attorney (Rec. 738)).
There is no proof that any of the money eollected
ever got into the 'hands of Mr. Erwin and there is no
competent evidence from which it ~can be deduced that
any .such n1oney got into his hands. This will be discusHed in greater detail under the neading of the insufficiency of the evidence.

II.
INSUF·FICIE·N,CY OF

EVID~iNiC·E

TO :SUPPORT

VERIDiiCT

So far as Mr. Erwin is concerned the corpus delicti
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in this case is an agreement bet,veen hin1 and •one or more
named ()r referrPd to co-conspirators plus at least one
of the alleged overt acts (if said acts are in truth overt
acts) done to effect the object of the agree1nent b~J one
or m.ore of the parties to suck agt·eement.
The evidence is not sufficient unless it proves an
agreement to commit the offense between Mr. Erwin
and ()De or more of the following: (1) Mr. Finch, (2)
Mr. Thacker, (3) Mr. Pearce, (4) Mr. Harmon, (5) Mr.
Stubeck, (6) Mr. Holt; and unless the evidence in addition to the proof of such agreement, proves an act
(which has ooen alleged) done to effect the object of
the agreement by one or 'mOre of the parties to such
agreement. It isn't .sufficient that an overt act be
proved. It isn't sufficient that the agreement and an
overt act he pro\ed. It isn't sufficient that the agreement
·and one of the overt a-cts alleged in the indictment (if
they are overt acts) be proved.
The state must prove '3-n agreement of Mr. Erwin
with one or more of the parties named to commit the
offense denounced by the statute ·an<t in addition the-reto must show an overt act (which has been alleged)
done to effect the obj·oots of the ·agreement by one or
more of the parties to such agreement.
;The agreement alleged in the indictment is an
agreement between Mr. Erwin, Mr. Finch, Mr. T:h~ker,
Mr. Pearce and Mr. Harmon ''together with divers
other persons to this grand jury unkn()wn''. The agreement was entered into ''on the 6th day of Jan nary, 1936,
and on divers other days and times between that day
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and the lst day of January, 1938". The tagreement was
''to ·commit acts injurious to p·ublic morals and for the
perversion and obstructio~n of justice and the due administration of the laws of the .state of Utah."
The agreement was "to permit, allow, assist tand
enable house·s of ill fame . . . and lotteries, dice games,
slot machines, book-making and other gambling devices
:and games of ·chance (card or poker games are not mentioned in the indictment) to he kept, maintained and operated at various places in Salt Lake City, .... " The
defendants ' ' then and there well knowing that said
houses of ill fame, lotteries, dice games, slot machines,
bookmaking and other gambling devices and games of
·chance, were being kept, maintained and -operated.... ''.

'There is no direct evidence of any agreement. If
·there is any evidence of sueh an 'agreement it is circumstanti'al. By an analy.siB of the te:S'timony of each witness whose testimony in any wise affected Mr. Erwin,
we will demonstrate that there w·a:s no dire-ct, cir·cumstan,tial or other evidence that he (or for that matter,
any other defendant) entered into any agreement to
commit ;any offense much less an agreement to commit
the offense· alleged.
The eorpus delicti cannot he p:roved hy a confession, admission or de·claration alone. You must 'put your
~hand over any alleged confession or admission or ooclaration and then see if there is aa1y independent eviSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dene.e proving the corpu~ delicti. Sta.te
95 Utah ;)7~. 83 Pac. (~d) 1010.

v~.

J o1mson,

The corpus delicti i~ the body of t hl~ c. rime. Proof
of the corpus delicti is essential to a c.onviction. It must
be pro,·ed beyond a reasonablt:\ doubt, and must exclude every hypotheses other than that a. crime was committed in order to c.onvict.
·The author of Underhill's Criminal Evidence,
Third Edition. Page 33, in discussing confessions and
admissions to pro\e the corpus delicti says:
A \obmtary confession or admission of the
accused is not sufficient to prove the ,corpus delicti unless there is other evidence in proof thereof
either direct or circumstantial; or, as it is frequently decided, a confession or admission by the
accused to prove the corpus delicti must be ''corroborated". The "corroboration" of a confession or admission which is required in order to
prove the corpus delicti refer not merely to facts
proring the confession but to facts concerning
the corpus delicti, or evidence independent of the
confession. The corroboration of a confession
does not necessarily prove the corpus delicti. The
other evidence required to establish the corpus
delicti in addition to that furnished by the confession need not be wholly independent on the
confession, and it need not connect the defendant with the crime. The corpus delicti may be established by the confession of the .acoosed together with corroboratin.g circumstances. Where
the evidenoo is :sufficient to show that the crime
has ibeen committed, or where there is any evidence dehors the confession in proof of the corpus delicti, the confession or admission is admisSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34

sible. A ·confession together with proof of the
·corpus ·delicti m~y sustai'l1 ·a conviction, but an
extfla..:judici'al confession alone will not sustain
a eonvi~ction. An extra-judicial confession is supp·orted by proof of the ·corpus d·elicti where the
evidence of both together p~roduces a conviction
-of guilt.
11 American Juris·prndence 574:
Declarations of an alleged conspirator are
not admissible against ·a co-conspirator in the
absence of evid;ence from which may be inferred
the l1atter's assent jointly with the other conspirators to the existe~~ce and execution of the
conspiracy within the statutory period of limitation, unless the statements are made in the presence of those against whom they are offered.

* * *
WITNES:SES
The state called 26 witnesses. ·Of these witnesses
-one was Agus.ta Friend, whose evidence was strickern
(901).
Four of the 26 witnesses were prostitutes, Alder,
Carlton, Newman and C·ollins. ·One of these four, Collins ( 902), c~aimed her privilege and did not testify as
to what her business was (910). Three testified that
they had paid money to Mr. Holt. One of the three testified .she· gave him an ovel'lcoat. They all testified. that
they had been engaged in prostitution in this city for
many yetars prior to January 6, 1936, and sirn·ce the 1st
day of January, 1938, and up to the time of the trial
(932), (914), (9·42). ·There cannot be any dispute but
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that house~ of ill fame operated in this eity long- before
.and long aft~r the above dah'~ (Holt's testituony 1030).
Prtl~titnt.~~.

generally, \vere atTP8ted 1nonthly or
semi-monthly, booked at the police ~ta.tion, examined for
venereal diseases. If found to be ·'clean'' were discharged to go back to their \Yell-known houses of ill
fame, and if found to be di~eased kept until they were
cured (1033).
Three of the witnesses \\~ere reformed gamblers,Goslin (54±), Hayes ( 821). Scott ( 677 et seq.). The
proof is that gambling such as mentioned in the indictment was carried on in Salt Lake long prior to and
after the dates mentioned in the indictment. There is
nothing in the evidence of any of these witnesses which
in the remotest degree connects the defendant Mr. Erwin (or for that matter any other defendant, with any
agreement or with the commission of any overt act,
nor is it claimed that any of these witnesses was a coconspirator.
The witness Ellett's testimony (1264) and the witness Headman's testimony (1497) do not affect this
defendant. If it affects any defendant, it was Mr. Thacker, who was acquitted. The witness Lewis's testimony
(967) does not affect this defendant. If it affected anybody, it affected Mr. Thacker who was ;acquitted. The
witness Kesler testified merely as to the quantity of
proof it took to prove the offense of bookmaking
(2018).
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'The above dis·poses of twelve witnesses. There are
fourteen remaining. Of these one, Weiler, was ·called to
prove the likelihood of Mr. Erwin agreeing with Mr.
Pearce to commit a crime by showing that on one oc·Casion while the witness was acting as :a deputy county
clerk in 1936, Mr.· Pearce a·cted as attorney in a case
filed in the City Court in 1934, and called Mr. Erwin
as a witness in a case in which he was not a party
(1243).
The wi tnes:s, Mis~s M·cDon:ald, ·City Recorder, testified that Mr. Erwin was sworn in as Mayor of Salt
Lake City the first Monday in January, 1936 (378);
that he resigne·d February 7, 1939 (378); that Mr.
Finch was discharged as Chief -of Police January 21,
1938 ( 379). While she was on the ~stand eity ordinamces
were introduced, one showing that the Ci t.y Board of
Health had control of prostitution (444).
0. B. Reeord testified (149·9) that he had been Inspector of Police for three years, and concernillg certain arrests in ·certain gambling houses.; that he was
next in line to the ~Chief of Police; that in the absence
of the Chief of Police, Mr. Thacker did not report to
Mr. Record. Hi~s testimorny seems not to be directed to·
W1ard Mr. Erwin. If it involved anyone, it involved Mr.
T~ha~cker who was acquitted.
The testin1ony of the witness Hoagland ( 2025) was
not directed to the defendant Erwin.
·The above four witnesses did not testify as. to
any agreement, nor as to the commission of any overt
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act in furtherance of any agreement. The testimony
of the remaining ten witnesses is claimed by the state
to affect the defendant Mr. _Erwin.
We now proc.eed to a close analysis of the testimony of these 'Yitnesses. ·The testimony of one is not
in any sense related to the testimony of the other, so
we will not take them in the order in w'hich they were
sworn, nor the order in which they testified.
The testimony of the mtnes.se.s Smith (492), E·arly
(460), lrrs. Runzler (1~52) and Prichard (1107) goes
to the proposition that Mr. Erwin's attention was called
·to the existence of a former Qr present underworld payoff in Salt Lake City.
MR. AcSTIK SMITH
Mr. Smith had ibeen appointed Mr. Erwin's secretary on January 6, 1936 (492). Shortly after Mr. Finch's
appointment and -at his invitation, Mr. Smith visited Mr.
Finch at his home (493). Mr. Smith received a memorandum in the first part of June, 1936 ( 497) .and in the
absence ·of Mr. Erwin left it on his desk (513). This
memorandum contained a list of supposed p.ayoffs in
town. The last place the witness ever saw the memorandum was on Mr. Erwin's desk (499). Mr. Smith hand~ the memorandum to Mr. Erwin and Mr. Erwin

said it would be immediately investigated; that he
did not know .anything about it ( 500). (All of this testimony was objected to and motions were made to
strike it on -all conceivable grounds).
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At the witne·ss Holt's request, the witness Smith
met Mr. Holt in Captain Taggart's office in the Federal Building (501). This occurred some time in June,
1936. Two days after that, Mr. ,S,mith had a conversa-

tion with Mr. Erwin in
Erwin

tha~t

hi~s

office. Mr. Smith told Mr.

he, Smith, had had ;a conversation with an

1mnamed p·arty who knew conditions first hand (503).
Mr. Smith told Mr. Erwin that there was a payoff going on; that there were vice ~conditions that were being talked about all up and down the street. Mr. Er'vin informed Mr. Smith that it would, be thoroughly
investigated. Two d:ay.s .afterwards, Mr. Smith met Mr.
Erwin and Mr. Finch and Mr. Holt in the Public Safety Building (504). On the day of this eonversation and
before the meeting in the Pulblic Safety Building Mr.
Sn1ith met Mr. Erwin at Mr. Er\vin 's office. Mr. Erwin
appeared to be very upset, and told Mr. Smith that
he, ·S.mith, ~should not be talki'llg to the people he had
talked to pertaining to the department .and. Mr. Erwin's
particular affairs ( 506). During the ·conversation in
Mr. Finch's office in the Public Safety Building, Mr.
Holt stated that there were vice conditions and that
Mr. Holt had called 'Mr. Smith to Mr. ·Taggart's office to
inform him so that he, S:mith, could tell Mr. Erwin
(507). When asked to state what Mr. Holt meant by
"vi·ce conditions" Mr. Smith testified that there was a
payoff .going on from houses of p~rostitution and ~am
bling houses. Mr. ·Smith w·as reprimanded for going
over in the enemy's camp and washing out dirty linen
(508).
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On cross examinntion Mr. Smith testified, that he
had not given the memor~mdum to Mr. Erwin but in
the absence -of Mr. Er,Yin he had left it on Mr. Erwin's
d~k and that he, Mr. Smith, had never seen the memorandum after that time (513). The memorandum was
not signed by Mr. Smith (514).
No\\, the most that can lbe said of this testimony
is that Mr. Holt a police officer, had· told Mr. Smith
that there \\as a payoff; that somebody had given Mr.
Smith a memorandum containing approximately the
same informati011, which memorandum was unsigned
and in the absence of ~Ir. Erwin was plaood on his desk
and \\as never thereafter seen, and that Mr. Holt repeated to :Mr. Erwin in the presence of Mr. :Finch that
there was such a payoff. The testimony is that several
times lrr. Erwin said the matter would be thoroughly
investigated. This does not constitute any evidence of
the agreement, nor of the commission of any ov-ert act
done to affect the object of any agreement by any one
or more of the parties to the agreement as is required
by 103-11-3 R. 8.1933.

MR. JOHNS. EARLY
About January 8, 1936, Mr. Early was appointed
by the City Commission as Office Manager, Public Safety iDepartment of Salt Lake ·City (499). Mr. Erwin
talked. to Mr. Early about this position after he, Mr.
Erwin, had lbeen assigned to the Department of Public
;Safety. Mr. Erwin stated to the witness that he had
heard that there w;as a payoff (466). Mr. Erwin
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asked, Mr. Early to get all of the information he could
with reference to it (467). Later on, Mr. Early told Mr.
Erwin. that he had discussed the matter with numerous officers. and had been unable to get any information whatever from t'hem ( 468). He told Mr. Erwin that
from 1another source he had learned that there was a
payoff of $2,000 per month from prostitution and gambling houses ( 469). He was not .asked for any reply
from Mr. Erwin but 21 pages further in the record the
witness testified that he told Mr. Erwin there were
rumors that there was. a vice p~ayoff and that Mr. Erwin said that the· entire matter was in the jurisdi;ction
of the Chief of Police. That Wias as near as the witness
could, recollect the statement ( 485). Later on, he told
l\ir. Er\vin again that he had heard rumors of a vice
payoff ( 486). The 'vitness was then asked if in these
conversations 'vith Mr. Erwin the witness. had mentioned that lVIr. Finch and Mr. E.rwin were involved
( 487). The witness said, ''No'' ( 488). Thereupon, the
proHecuting attorney "\vas permitted to eross e:x!amine
the witness over objection and finally, to the same question, Mr. Early answered, ''Yes, I did tell him that,
that I had advised them that I heard that they were
involved, that there were such rumovs around.'' When
a'Sked what 1\Ir. Erwin said, Mr. Early testified, "1
can '.t recall his exact words, but he dis·claimed all
kno\\rledge of it, of course, both him and Mr. Finch.''
( 490). Thereupon the witness was ex·cused.
·There is nothing in Mr. Early's testimony which
proves or tends to prove any agreement or the commi,ssion of any overt act or \vhich constitutes an adSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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mission or a confession or is in a11y sense competent or releYmlt unless pr1-or or subst\quent to the receipt of such testinlPny the corpus delicti is proved.
MRS. W. T. R.lTNSLER
Mrs. Runsler tes.tifie-d that early in 1937, she and
Mrs. Earl 'Tan Cott and Mrs. Lee \Yright called on Mr.
Erwin at his office in the City and County Building.
Mrs. Runsler was State Director, Salt Lake City District, 1;tah Federaition of \V omen '·s Clubs ( 1253). In
this oonversation lrrs. , . . an Cott stated that accorditng
to information she h.ad received Mr. Erwin was receiving a payoff of $750.00 a month, the chief $350.00 and
other operators $250.00. Mrs. Runsler testified that
when this statement was made Mr. Erwin flushed considerably and stated, '' Oh, I am accused of that too,
am I-?" (1257) Then ~fr. Erwin took a cigarette and
asked if he might smoke and changed the sufb~ect
(1258). 'l'his does not constitute evidence of agreement
or of the doing of one of the overt acts ·and does. not
constitute an admission that l\Ir. Erwin was receiving
the $750.00 per month payoff. It \vas not received by
the court as -an admission. Mrs. Runsler simply Sttated
that Mrs. Van Cott stated that according to information she had received such a;nd such were the facts.
'This was not an accusation made by Mrs. Van Coit that
what she had heard was true. She m~ght have smilingly said, ''I have heard that you are participating in a
payoff.'' The very form of her question might have
led him to believe that she, Mrs. Van Cott, did not believe the rumor. The point is, ·no one had accused him
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of any offense and this alleg·ed "payoff" was not in
.any sense identified. No man, espe·cially a public of:fi.cer, is ·called upon to constantly deny every rumor of
which he is informed. And if he doesn't deny it, his
failur-e cannot be cons1trued to he an admis·sion. Nor
can his failure be construed to be evidence of an agreement or the commission of an overt act.

MR. A. M. PRIC:HARD
T·he witness Prichard testified that he was the city
sexton; that prior to that he had been a detective;
that he frequently met Mr. Erwin in his office· where
he !brought plants from the cemetery. In the fall of
1936, he had a ·conversation with Mr. Er,vin (1108) irn
which he told Mr. Erwin that there was a payoff in
town and the women's organization of Salt Lake City
had .a list of all the payoffs, the names of the parties
paying off, the- amount they were paying off, and tihey
were going to have a meeting about it (1108-A). Mr.
Erwin and Mr. Prichard talked about this information and Mr. Erwin asked Mr. Prichard if Mr. Prichard
could .get Mr. Erwin a copy of the list and Mr. Prich.aDd said he would try (1109).
About three days afterwar-ds, he returned and
gave Mr. Erwin a list of the nam·es of the people that
were supposed to be paying the payoff, their addresses,
.and the a~mount they were paying. Mr. Erwin s.tated
that it was unbelievable and from that day to the time
of the trial the matter was never mentioned by Mr.
E·rwin to Mr. Prichard (1110). The witness was exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cused.
This does not constitute evidence of an agreement
or of the cormni~siou of an OVl'\I"t .act in furtherrunce
of an agreement. It eertainly i~n 't an ad1nission. Mr.
Erwin 'Ya~ not accused of taking· pa.rt of the money.
He did not ~ay he 'Yould not inYestig·a.te it. He said
it was lmbelieva.ble and put the paper in his desk. He
vn1s not called upon to make any denial. He was not
called upon to do anything other than "~hat he did do.
Hanng done exactly what he did do, ho'v can it be
said that that constitutes evidence of an agreement or
of the commission of an overt aet in furtherance of any
agreement.

H.KRECORD
:Mr. Record had Jbeen a police officer of Salt Lake
City for fifteen years and in the early part of 1936
was chief of the anti-vice squad (948). He testified that
he visited :)lr. Pearce in his office in the Continental
Bank Building and in the presence of Mr. Harmon Mr.
Pearce told him that he, ~Ir. Pearce, was responsible
for Mr. Record's appointment to the head of the vice
squad "and that the mayor had instructed him to make
collections from gambling houses and other forms of
vice.'' T-hereupon, Mr. Record asked how much they
wanted or expected to get and Mr. Pearce is alleged to
have said, '' $1700 .a month.'' After talking about the
sources of this money Mr. Record said that he wo.wd
have nothing to do with it and Mr. P~-arce said, '~All
right, we will get somebody else to handle it." (~5~)
At this stage of the trial, no evidence of the corpus de\
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licti ·had been introduced, nor was any thereafter introd~ced. It is ·claimed by the state that because Mr.
Pearce used in this alleged eonversation the term
''mayor'' that Mr. Er,vin is somehow bound lby the
tes·timony as showing that Mr. Erwin w.as a party to
·an agreement to make the ·collections referred to. iT·aken in connection with other testimony in the reeord or
taken alone and given the full force of anything that possibly can be ·claimed for it, it amounts to nothing so
far as Mr. Erwin is ·concerned. From it, the jury could
not possibly properly deduce that there was any agreement or that any overt act had been committed, or that
any {)Vert act would be ·Committed in furtherance of
any agreen1ent. It should have been stricken as was
strenuously argued by counseL

1\IR. 1DAR KEMPNE.R
Mr. Kempner testified that s-ome time during the
months of April, May or June, 1937, he saw a Mr .
.Stubeck. That early in the spring of 1937 (774) he accompanied Mr. :S,tuheck to certain pool halls and card
rooms. Th·at at ·alhout 3 :00 o '·clock i'll the afternoon of
that day (776) the witness and Mr. Stubeck went to
248 ·South Main Street and Mr. ·Stubeck went up to a
man "rho vras racking pool balls on the pool tables and
asked that man if he had the money ready (779). (All
of this testimony 'vas. strenuously objeeted, to by counsel and in the mids·t of the objections the state announced that Mr. Stube·ck was one of the- conspirators
( 780). The witness then testified that the man racking
pool' 'balls said, "I haven "t quite got all of i·t." (782)
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Whereupon, Mr. Stubec.k told hin1 bt\ had 1lH\tter gPt
it in a hurry or he would know· the rf\~u lt ( 78~~). 'fhat
man left the plaee and said he "Tould ht) ijlnek right
away. When he returned he had ~orne enrrency in his
hand. Thereupon, :Mr. Stnbeek ~aid, ''All right'', and
put the money in his pocket. The ·witness and Mr. Stubeck then went to 2~~ South M.ain Street. The witness
went to get a drink of coca cola, and Mr. Stubeck
went into the card room. After he had been in the card
room the two of them left. Thereupon, the prosecuting
attorney asked the witne5s :
'• Q. Then, after you got upstairs, did he
say anything to you-?" (784)

This \\as objected to and during the course of objections and argument, the court said, ''Of course, this is
of importance. H it should develop that it isn't pertinent, I presume that it would be a mistrial. I am not
saying that it would, lbut I presume it would. '' Whereupon, the witness testified that Mr. Stubeck told him
that all card games were paying off and that some of
them were trying to chisel by giving him less money
than they should. (786). The witness asked Mr. Stubeck
who was paying off and Stubeck answered that all cal'ld
clubs were paying off. The witness asked him
who gets the money and the witness testified that Stubeck said, "Well, I take it over to Ben Harmon's plaee."
Then ·the witness said,____ ''Well, does Ben Harmon
get that money?' And the witness stated that StuJbeck
said, '~Well, he splits it with Erwin and his crowd.''
(787)
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.On what theory is this evidence competent or relevant~ Up· to this point there has been no connection
by Wtay of pleadrng or otherwise be·tween Mr. Erwin
and Mr. Stuheck, or between Mr. Erwin and Mr. Harmon, except that Mr. Harmon is one of the defendants.
We will hereafter discuss the question of whether
or not Mr. Stubeck and Mr. Holt were co-conspirators.
But for the time being suffice it to say that Mr. Erwin
·can't be bound by this testimony unless it can fbe shown
that Mr. Stubeck gave the money to Mr. Harmon and
Mr. Harmon gave the money to Mr. Erwin pursuant
to an agreement and under circumstances which charged
Mr. E~rwin with knowledge of the source of this money.
The testimony of Kempner is not evidence that Stubeck
made any collections of money pursuant to an agreement or that he paid it to Mr. Harmon pursuant to
that agreement, or that Mr. Harmon paid it to Mr. Erwin pursuant to that agreement.
Twenty-two witnesses have now testified and there
isn't a scintilla of evidence that any agreement was
ever entered into or that any overt act was ever committed to effectuate such an agreement.

MR. GOLDEN HOLT
T·he prosecuting attorney early announced that he
did not elaim !tfr. Holt wasn't a ·conspirator. He claimed
that he was (93.2). Thereafter, he ·claimed that he was a
co-1actor ( 973).
Mr. Holt testified (962) that he had been a police
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officer for uuu1y y~ars prior to 1~):H): that ltt\ had bPPn
connected \Yith the auti-Yiet\ ~quad of the polieP departIuent and that in ~lnreh of 1D36 he \Ya~ appointed ehief
of the anti-,ice squad by the rhi~f of police. He te~tified
concerning the converBation to \Yhich the \Yitness ~1nith
had previon~ly testified to the effect that he had heanl
of a payoff (~166). He te~tified that later the chief told
him to close everything up (~1l1~) and that he \\?ent around
and did clo5e them up (969) and that they re1nained
closed for about a month.
He te~tified he had another conver~ation \Vith ~lr. Finch
in the latter part of July~ 1~136, at \vhich conversation
lir. Finch told ::Jir. Holt to see ~Ir. Rosenblun1 ( 660).
That he sa\\- ~Ir. Rosenblum and Rosenbhnn told hin1 to
go and collect from the women (970). ::Jir. Rosenblum
told him the places that were operating and the an1ounts
to collect from each place; that he did make collections
from them and turned the money over to Jir. Rosenblu1n
(971). He testified as to the amounts he collected from
houses of prostitution ( 972). ~-1.t this point the district
attorney claimed that the \vitness Holt was a conspirator
(973). He testified that he had another conversation with
the chief and the chief told him to let the places remain
open but not let them run too openly (974) and that he
just let them run (975). He testified that in January of
1937, the chief told him to close everything up and that
he was going to give the witness another man on the
squad to see that there was absolutely no more payoff.
He testified that he was removed from that position the
first of ~{arch (976) and that H. K. Record took his
place; that later he was put back on the vice squad
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(977) ; that later ~1 r. Thacker told him to take charge of
prostitution and that ~lr. Thacker would take charge of
gambling. He testified that he had had a conference ·with
Mr. Ben Haruton in J\;lay of 1937 at the Mint (982) and
that Ben Harn1on told hin1 he wanted to collect from the
places of prostitution (984) and that Ben Harmon told
hirn the arnount that he would collect from each place
( 985). The last collection \vas rnade the 1st day of Jannary, 1938. Asked where he took the n1oney that he collected in June, he testified he took it to Mr. Harmon and
1\Tr. Harn1on told hin1 to take it to :1\tfr. Pearce's office
(938). That was the 3rd or 4th of June, 1937. The witness went to Mr. Pearce's office and entered the lobby.
1'Ir. Pearce told hin1 to con1e in which he did and laid
the n1oney on the desk. l\1 r. I)earce picked the money
up and put it in the dra\ver of the desk (1001). ~Ir.
Har1non \vas sitting in a chair left of the desk. There
\vas about $500.00 (1002). The \vitness testified that at
a later conversation with 1fr. Harn1on, Mr. Harmon told
hin1 that Mr. Pearce had accused the \Vitness of holding
out on hin1 and \van ted the \vitness to go to Mr. Pearce ·s
office and see hin1 ( 1004). The 'vitness went to Thfr.
Pearce's office and was sho\vn a slip of paper with a
list' of places on it ( 696). After they had talked a while
1\fr. Pearce told the 'vitness that he thought the witness
\vas doing a fine job ( 1005).
On cross-exa1nination the \vitness testified that the
chief told hin1 to bring the prostitutes in for examination
as that was done in the past (1030). That the prostitutes \Vere brought in about every two weeks. That where
they could, they \Vould try to keep track of where the
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girls were. That as the pro~titutt'~ c~une to hnvn, the
witness 'vould find out "·ho tlu~y "'Pl'l' and ~PP thnt tht'Y
were brought into the Board of Health. The poliee de.:.
partment had their nalnt~~ and nddre~~P~. ThPy wPr<.~
booked on the book entitled · · Regi~ter of . .\.rrestf', Salt
Lake City Corporation·' (10~~~). The pro~titutes \Vere
handled the same ''ay during all the thne the "·itness was
on the anti-nee squad (103:1). The 'vitne~s te~tified that
he had been taking collections to ~\be Rosenblu1n until
the 1st day of January. 1937 (1039). The 'vitness never
reported any of these transactions to any officer, city
attorney, or to anyone else until after the alleged. conspiracy had ended. The "Witness testified that J\fr. Finch
said to him. ''I don't see "·hat has been done that could
cause this talk about taking money from the underworld
and about the department being tied up 'vith the underworld.'' ...lnd the "Witness stated in reply, ''I don't know
how anyone could have anything on you. You don't need
to worry. I do not know of anything that involved you
in this. '' (1046)
During the period in question the witness testified
that he was living at the ~Ioxum Hotel for a period of
about sixteen or seventeen months (1069); that he had
been divorced from his wife and was living apart from
her. That he was driving an automobile and that he
bought a lot of stock in the Dead Cedar Mining Company
and the Lead Strike Mining Company. He invested in
these stocks $300.00 on two different occasions in i937
(1070),, and the money was paid in currency (1071). The
witness made substantial investments in stock ( 1072),
that the witness's salary as patrolman was between $155
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to $165 a month (1077). That up to Septe1nber of 1938,
the witness had never had a conversation with Mr. Erwin,
had never associated with l\1 r. Erwin, was never present
at any conversation or at any place when anyone else
had a conversation with Mr. Erwin concerning any payoff
or anything of that kind; that he never reported any
vice conditions to nir. Erwin (1080). None of this testimony in the slightest degree tends to prove directly
or indirectly that ~fr. Erwin (or for that matter any
other defendant) was a party to any agreen1ent or conspiracy as alleged, or other,vise or at all, or that he in
any fashion participated \vith anyone to co1nmit any overt
act to effect the purposes of any agreement. There isn't
an admission, a declaration, a confession or any circumstances that can be tortured into proof of anything connecting Mr. Ervvin with the offense charged.
MR. FISHER HARRIS
Th1r. Harris testified that s1nce :Jiarch 13, 1932, he
had been and that he still -vvas City Attorney for Salt
Lake City (1288); that during the fall and \Vinter of
1937 he made an investigation of vice conditions in the
city and that as a result thereof prepared a letter \vhich
he delivered to :n1r. Erwin on January 15, 1937 (1290).
January 15th fell on Saturday.
So far as Mr. Er,vin is concerned the highlights of
Mr. Harris's testimony are:
The letter of January 14, 1938 (Exhibit R).
The conversations 1\Ir. Harris·had with Mr.
Erwin at the City and C~unty Building.
3. The conference at the Alta Club.
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The court w·ill not be ~atisfied \rith any di~en~~ion
of his testiinony unle~s and until it rt\ad~ thP reeord .. It~
introduction "·a~ ~trennou~ly objeeh~d to on nll eoneeivable grounds by all partie~ at all tinte~. In our di~en~
sion of )[r. Harri~ \;;. te~ti1nony at thi~ tin1e wt\ p;ive
full weight to "-hat he ~aid and expeet to den1on~trate
that it dt)es not constitute proof (a) of the alleged agrPement. (b) of any overt art. (c) of any ad1nis~able (•onYPrsation. adrnission or declaration.
THE LETTr:R
The letter "-as not offered or receiYecl in evidence
as an admission (1293). It \vas not offered to prove its
contents (1296).
It ''as not offered to sho\v that the things stated in
the letter actually existed ( 1297).
The district attorney exa1nined .Jir. Harris concerning the contents of the letter ( 1291). The letter had not
been offered in evidence ( 1293).
The letter \Yas offered as Exhibit "R" ( 1295) for
the purpose of showing the reaction of the former mayor
as to this letter (1296).
It \vas admitted for the purpose indicated (whatever
that is), not as evidence of the things therein stated
(1301).
For the convenience of the Court we are producing
this exhibit. It will be noted that the letter has been
fastened together and unfast€ned at least three times;
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that the first page was written· on one typewriter and the
second page written on another type,vriter, that the first
page is dated January 14, 1938 and the second page is
dated January 12, 1938, with a 4 written over the 2.
There is attached to the exhibit a slip of paper which
indicates that it was filed for record on the motion or
~{r. Erwin.
EXHIBIT R
''La'v Department
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
Salt Lake City, Utah
January 14, 1938.
Hon. E. B. Er,vin, ~iayor, and
Board of Commissioners,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
Gen tle1nen :
During the past several months rumors of
corrupt alliance bet\veen officers and employees
of the Department of Public Safety and operators
of various illegal establishments in Salt Lake City
have reached me with such frequency and from
so n1any sources of apparent reliability that I
found it to be my official duty to make an independent investigation of their validity, and, having made it, to inform you of the result.
I have found the follo,ving in actual existence
and operation :
LOTTERIES:
456 vVest 2nd South
458 West 2nd South
472 West 2nd South
435 West 2nd South
439 West Second South
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DICE

G-4-\.)[r~S:

'Zapeon
TesternClub-5G
Soeial Clu

POKER

l)-~~;) l~

'y est

~nd

,,~ e~t ~nd

South

South

ft.\.~[E~S:

Past Time Clu~)j En~t ~nd 8outh
Bank Sn1oke Shop-58 En~t 2nd 8outh
:llission Cigar Store-129 8outh )lain
Peter Pan Card Club---2:22 South l\lain
Horse Shoe Card Rooin--!9 East 2nd South
~int Card Club-27 East 2nd South
Wilson Card Room-32 East 2nd South
BOOKlf..ll{ERS:
Basement ..:\.tlas Bldg.
Basement Xew Grand Hotel
124 East 2nd South
First Floor,"''~ oodruff Apts.
K ewhouse Building
Ron. E. B. Erwin-Page 2

Jan. 14, 19:38

HOUSES OF PROSTITUTION:
63% West 2nd South
253 South West Temple
143% West 3rd South
133 West 3rd South
143% East 2nd South
128% West 1st South
243% West 2nd South
31 West 1st South
36 East 4th South
127% West 1st South
123 West 3rd South
255 South 1st West
Piedmont Hotel-249% South State St.
Rex Hotel-253 South State St.
I have found that all of these exist, and have
existed to the knowledge and with the connivance
of the officers of the Police Department charged
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with the duty of their suppression.
I have found also that, with rare exceptions,
no illegal activity in Salt Lake City is exempt fron1
the payment of tribute; that those I have mentioned, with a few exceptions, pay each Inonth a
previously agreed upon a1nount for the privilege
of operating during that month.
The persons who actually collect this tribute,
and its amount, in each case are as well known to
me as those \vho pay it, and it is known to me
also to who1n it is ultimately distributed.
You will notice that I say in each instance that
''I have found,'' etc. By this I n1ean that I am not
repeating run1ors or street gossip. I have related
undeniable facts and facts of such public notoriety
that to ascertain them required little more than
the desire to do so.
Very truly yours,

( s)

FISHER HARRIS,

City Attorney.''
Apparently the letter \vas offered and received in
connection \Vith a statement attributed to n1r. Er,vin' 'Why, I have never heard anything like this before,''
when it is claimed that he had heard all those things before (1504). After this letter \vas admitted it was referred to, read froin, discussed, handled, and then stricken
as an exhibit but was left to remain in the record (1379
and 1380).
CONVERSATIONS
The witness had two or three conversations with ~lr.
Erwin at his office in the City and County Building. The
contents of the letter were discussed and the penciled
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mrunoranda on tl1e letter wt.\rt.\ nutde by ~I r. Er,vin.
None of these conversation~ involvPd the n~e~~~ity of 1\lr.
Er"·in 1uaking any denial~ or adinission~. He "·a~ not
charged "ith taking any 1noney fro1n thP allt.)~Pd eollections and if the 'vitne~~ kne"· that ~Ir. Er,,·in ,,·a~ receiring such n1oney he did not di~eu~~ the fact \vith
~Ir.

Er"in.

COXFEREXCE

~\T ~\LT-6.-\.

CLUB

This conference occurret l on January 201 1938. Mr.
Fish1 connected with the Salt Lake Telegra1n, had invited ~Ir. Bourn and :Jir. Heal. connected with the Salt
Lake Tribune. llr. HarTis. :Jlr. Finch and 1Ir. Erw"in·to
take luncheon at the Alta Club on that date ( 1360). ~I r.
Harris purposely did not attend the luncheon until after
the other parties had finished eating ( 1360). The "·itness
was requested to state the con\ersa tion had in the presence of these men (1360). The evidence \Vas admitted
as against ~Iessrs. Er"in and Finch only (1361).
The witness stated that :Jir. Fish said that they. had
heard rumors of an investigati<Jn being made in regard
to underworld activities and in regard to official corruption and he demanded to know what it "yas all about.
The "·itness answered that he had 1nade a cornplete
report of the matter to :Jir..Er,,·in, in writing. In response to an investigation to do so, the \vitness enumerated them (1361). The 'vitne:-:s enurnerated the amount
of each kind of activity paid. Whereupon, Mr. Fish said:
"Do you know who gets this money and to whom is it
finally distributed?'' ( 1362), a:nd the witness said that he
did and then Mr. Fish said: "Who~" The witness said:
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''E. B. Erwin gets $750 per 1nonth. Harry Finch gets
$500.00 per month. The amount collected.'' The witness
said that Mr. Erwin was about five and one-half feet distant from him at the time the state1nent was made and
that neither Mr. Erwin nor ~1r. Finch said anything
( 1362).
On cross examination, ~1:r. Harris testified that the
gentle1nen present had been invited to the luncheon; that
the luncheon was served on a rectangular shaped table,
something the shape of the counsel table in the court
roo1n (1407), the long way was east and west. Mr. Erwin
sat on the west end of the table and l\1r. Fish on the east
end of the table and \vhen ~lr. Harris came in he sat at
~1r. ~.,ish's right.
~lr. Finch was directly across from
~Jr. Harris. l\ir. Bourn \vas at his right and l\1:r. Heal
\vas seated at Mr. Er,vin 's right on the west end of the
table (1407).
The \vitness testified that he dre"\v a piece of paper
fron1 his pocket and wrote some figure on it and 'vas
doing what he called "doodling." l\1r. Fish may have
asked 'vho got the money before the \vitness \Vrote the
figures on the paper (1407).
Thereupon, the following occurred:

Q.

(by l\fr. l\1usser) Now, as a result of
that, l\Ir. Harris, your testimony in the other case
-as you recall, didn't you write :this on this
piece of paper and just show it to Mr. Fish at
your left~
A. I rather believe I did. I believe I did
sho'v l\fr. Fish that piece of paper if that is 'vhat
you are asking.
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Q. Ye~. that is exaetly "'hat...:\nd that paper
had on it the figures 7;)o in one plnef~ and 2;)0
in another place·?
. .:\...

250 you

~a y.

Q. '\'Va~ it 250 or 500!
A. 500.
Q. X ow. shortly after that the n1eeting broke
up, did it not!
A. Well, ~oon after it broke up, yes. ( 1408)
Mr. Erwin'~ failure to make any reply to )Ir. Harris's
statement does not constitute an admission that an agreement ''as entered into or that an overt act was committed. The occ-asion was at a luncheon party at 'vhich Mr.
Erwin and the other gentlemen "-ere the guests of Mr.
Fish and nothing is stated as to what occurred prior to the
time Mr. Harris entered into the conversation.
There is no showing that )Ir. Erwin heard the statement. The statement \\as probably not made.
If he did hear it he was under no obligation to reply
to it under the circumstances of the occasion.

And his failure to reply to it does not constitute
any admission, declaration or confession.
MR.

ERWI~'S

RESIGNATION

Mr. Harris testified that on January 26, 1938, Mr.
Erwin's attorney, Mr. Stewart, handed him, Mr. Harris,
a resignation signed by Mr. Erwin. That was marked
Exhibit '' S'' and was offered and received in evidence
(1367). That at a later date l\1r. Erwin sent the City
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hi bit '' T '' and \vas pffered and received In evidence
(1372).
The witness testified that he demanded the second
resignation fro m~1r. J~r,vin (1378). These \Vere not offered or received on any theory that they tended to prove the
agreeinent or that they tended to prove any of the overt
acts and they \Vere \vholly iininaterial until the corpus
delicti had been proved.
The 1notion to strike should have been granted.

MR. BEN HUNSAKER, AND
MR. CLIFFORD HUNSAKER
·The testimony of these two witnesses will be considered together. The court \viii not be satisfied \vith
this testin1ony without reading the record.
Ben Hunsaker \vas interested in a corporation selling automobiles, kno\vn as the Gate\vay Chevrolet, Inc.
Mr. Erwin joined in this undertaking in 1932 and put
into the business about $1,000 ( 1145).
The Gateway Chevrolet, Inc. became indebted to
Ben Hunsaker for $18,500 incurred before 1\{r. Erwin became connected with the Company. This \Vas represented
by a note ( 1145). The note \Vas finally paid do\vn to
$10,000 ( 1146). Thereafter and on or about l\farch 23,
1936, Mr. Er\vin individually signed a note in favor of
:n1r. Hunsaker for the $10,000 and agreed to pay. it at
the' ·rate of $200 per month out of Mr. Erwin's salary
(1119} ..
Ben
Hunsaker and Clifford Hunsaker came down to
.
Sal~ ·Lake to get the note signed and met Mr. Erwin in
!

I

•
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his office in the City and l't)unty Building nnd after di~
cnssing the note and "·ithout furth~r adiPu lh\n tllUl~h kPr
said that he \Yanted 1r r ..Er\Yi.n to pay the notP out nf hi~
~alary and not out of graft-that ~Jr. 1 1 ~r,rin had h~Pn
crooked, but that he \\·antt:\d hin1 to go straight front
then on {lllS).
Thereafter the "itne~~ te~tified to nu1n~rou~ l'()flYersations had behYeen hun and J[r. Er,rin. Hi~ son.
Clifford, testified that he "~as present at the ti1ue ~! r.
Erwin signed the note and kne"- that the note \YH~ to be
paid out of Mr. Er"in ·s salary.
Thereafter :llr. Er,,-in 1nade Inany pa~~nent:s on t~1e
note in question, one \Yas n1ade by check: one \Yas by
\Yes tern Union money order: seven \\·ere made to Ben
Hunsaker in currency for "-hich receipt:s ,,~ere given:
six were made to :Jirs. Hunsaker, for "~hich receipts "rere
given; three "·ere made to Clifford Hunsaker, for ,,-hich
receipts were given and one '"-a=' made to Dorothy Stone,
for which a receipt \Vas given.
Ben Hunsaker testified that on the occasions when
money was paid to him and on one or two other occasions
1Ir. Erwin stated that (a) he had his chief of police and
m~ney was coming in, (b) that he. \van ted the department
of finance because he said he would make plenty of money,
(c) that they couldn't catch him hecause he didn't do
the collecting, (d) that they couldn't catch the ch~ef of
police because he didn't do any collecting, (e) that they
had the ·woinen lined up, ( f} that he paid the money in
currency so that the banks wouldn't know his business,
(g) that he was glad Ben Hunsaker 'vas not making an
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income tax report of it because he didn't want to, etc.
None of this testimony was admissable unless the
agreement and an overt act had been proved or was to
be proved.
No inference can be drawn from it that Mr. Erwin
agreed with anybody to do the things alleged in the indictment or referred to in the bill of particulars. They
do not arnount to conversations, declarations or admissions. The fact that he made payments in currency is
not proof that he did not come into possession of the
money legally or that if he came into possession of the
rnoney illegally he got it from houses of vice in Salt Lake
City.
It is significant to note that Ben Hunsaker accepted
these payments without complaint and 'vithout notifying
anybody of his receipt of them or of his suspicions with
respect to them.
The court will read with interest the threatening letters and telegrams sent by Ben Hunsaker to Mr. Erwin,
exhibits 16, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. It 'vill also read with
interest the letter sent by Mr. Lo,ve to Mr. Stewart,
(defendants' exhibit 22) in 'vhich Mr. Lowe states that
the letter is being dictated in the presence of Mr. Hunsaker. Mr. Hunsaker admits it (1177). They state "The
mayor is a good n1an and we want to assist hirn in maintaining his high standing in Salt Lake."
Now, this letter 'vas written January 12, 1938, alrnost t'vo years after the conference held in the mayor's
office in March of 1936, and after all of the ''slimy stuff''
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Ben Hunsaker had testified to a~ having oeen rred in the
meantime.
In this same letter they al~o 8aid tl1n.t they had tal1H_\d
the difficulty over ·'and ",.bile the runount ~hould be paid
and probably would be paid if suit "·ere filed, "·e both
nevertheless want to help the n1ayor and are Yery loathe
to see him embarrassed.:-·

This concludes the State's case.
The court instructed the jury that there \Yas no suffi.cient direct or positive evidence that the defendants, or
any of them, with each other, or other"\\;se, actually met
or came together or expressly agreed to commit or pursue
any common design or purpose or to commit or do any
of the things or matters alleged in the indictment. (Instruction Xo. 7, Abs. 264.)
Now, what circumstantial evidence was there to
prove the charges!
No witness testified as to any conversation between
or amongst or with respect to any of the defendants concerning any agreement.
No one paid any money to :\:{r. Erwin. No one paid
any money to anyone else with instructions to deliver it
to Mr. Erwin. No person who collected money from
houses of vice told the operators that the money was for
Arfr. Erwin. No person who paid money was told that if
he paid it he could continue to operate his establishment.
There is no evidence of the reason why operators
of pool halls and card games paid money to the witness
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ner (denied by Stubeck) that Stubeck told Kempner that
there was a pay-off. There is no proof that any paJinents
to Stubeck constituted a pay-off. If these operators did
pay the witness Stubeck rnoney and if Stubeck said that
this 1noney vlas paid for protection, that does not prove
any agreement or conspiracy, nor does it prove any one
of the overt acts.
The witness Holt never testified that he made any
collection at the instance of l\1r. Erwin or that he paid
any money to anyone to be turned over to ~1r. Erwin
(he certainly kept the overcoat that the prostitute Sadie
Alder gave hiin).
Disregarding Stubeck's denial and giving weight to
the. fantastic testimony of Ken1pner, collections fro1n
houses of vice \vere n1ade only by Stubeck and Holt. The
money Stubeck collected \Vas put on the cashier's desk
at the l\iint Cafe.
The 1noney Holt eollected, \vhich was not kept by
him, was turned over to: (1) Abe Rosenblum, who was
not even designated by the State or the Court as being
a co-actor or a co-conspirator; ( 2) Ben Harrnon, ·who is
now dead and with whom Mr. Erwin was not even acquainted; ( 3) l\fr. Pearce, the attorney for Mr. Harmon,
and in the presence of l\fr. Harmon.
The only way the State can possibly connect any of
this money with Mr. Erwin is by \Yay of confessions,
admissions or declarations.
When Mr. Erwin replied to nfrs. \:ran Cott: "Oh!
they're accusing 111e of that, too, are they?", he did not
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thereby 1nake an ad1uission that ean be eon8trlH.'d n~ any
proof of the eorpns delicti in thi~ ensP.
\\~hen

he said to :Jl r. Harris with rP~pt:~et to the lPtter (Exhibit R): '·I hnYt' neYt'r heard of sueh things. It
is unbelievable,·' he did not thert\hy 1nakP any 8ueh adllllSSlOll.

\\~hen

he did not reply t\l the ~tate1nent by :Jl r. Harris
at the Alta Club (if he heard the staten1ent). he did not
thereby confess or admit or declare that he "·as a party
to an agreement to permit house~ of Yice to operate in
Salt Lake City or that he had actually rereiYed such
money.
\\~hen

:Jir. Erwin told Ben Hunsaker the things Ben
Hlmsaker testified to, he did not thereby confess, ad1nit
or declare that he \Yas a party to a conspiracy to per1nit
houses of vice to be operated in Salt Lake City or that
he was receiving any monies collected fro1n such places
by the witne~ses Holt and Stubeck.
So far as applicable and in support of his contentions, ~Ir. Erwin adopts the argument contained in the
brief filed in this cause on behalf of :Jfessrs. Pearce and
...
Finch. (See that brief, page 60 et seq.)
On the lack of proof of the conspiracy, ~~ r. Erwin
adopts the brief and argument, so far as applicable to
his case, presented on behalf of ~Iessrs. Pearce and Finch.
(See that brief, page 74 et seq.)

E\:IDENCE ERRONEOUSLY AD:l\IITTED

h~

1. Kempner's testimony that Stubeck told him that
collected money from pool halls and card rooms and
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took it over to l3en IIar.n1on and Ben Harmon split it
with Erwin and his crowd.
2. Fisher Harris's testimony relating to the letter
of January 12-14, 1938 (State Exhibit R).
3. Evidence of witnesses to the effect that they told
Mr. Erwin that a pay-off was being conducted.

4. The testimony of H. K. Record concerning his
alleged conversation with Mr. Pearce.
5. The testimony of Golden Holt concerning collections made by him to and for .AJbe Rosenblum and Ben
Harmon.
6. The testimon_y of the prostitutes tha_t they paid
1noney to Holt.
With respect to these rna tters vve adopt the argument made on behalf of 1\iessrs. Pearce and Finch.

ERRONEOUS INSTRUCTIONS
GIVEN BY THE COURT
The ~court in instruction 16 intended t-o cover the
elements that must be proved before any of the defendants could be convicted in this case. However, the court
erroneously omitted from this instruction and from other
instructions the element that the overt act must be done
by one of the conspirators.
Section 103-11-3 states:

* * * * unless some act besides such agreement
is done to effect the object thereof by one or 1nore
of the parties to such agreement.
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Instruction 16 n1erely stntt's:

(~~)~)-~~)7,

nh. 271)

* • * (5) tlu1t at Iea8t one of tlH_} foll<nving
overt acts 'vas connnitted:

~ ~

•.

(6) that any such ovt:•rt aet or art8 was or
were in furtherance of said conspiracy. agret•lnent
or combination charged in the indietment.
Nor has the deficiencY. in this instruction
been cured
.
by any other instruction given by the court.
The court erroneously gaYe instruction 18 for in that
instruction the court instructed : ( 258 ; a b. 27 4)

* =~= =~= It is enough if the common purpose and
design was formed in the manner and way as
charged in the indictment and that any one of
the alleged overt acts was done in furtherance of
such design and purpose by either of the defend* then the act of either one of the defendants
ants or the acts of said Golden Holt, Ben Harmon
or Abe Stubeck in furtherance of the common
purpose and design proved, as aforesaid, will be
regarded as the act of all.
$

"'

This instruction does not give the necessary statutory requirement for one of the overt acts very well
could have been accomplished by one of the defendants
or by Golden Holt, Ben Harmon or Abe Stubeck and
been in furtherance of the common purpose and design
and still not have been an overt act of one of the parties
to such agreement for if the act was not done know~gly by
one of the parties, then such party would not, under the
court's instruction 19, have been a party to the conspiracy unless he had prior thereto entered into the agreement. It is apparent that such act could have been accomSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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plished by one of the defendants without having been an
act of a conspirator for the defendant Thacker \Vas ac.
quitted, and though he \vas a defendant, he \vas not a
conspirator.
Instruction 9-A is defective in that said instruction
gave the jury a right to convict anyone who actually participated in the conspiracy or in the carrying out of said
agreement regardless of whether said defendants knowingly participated in the coiispiracy or carrying out of
said agreernent. This instruction is also in conflict ,vith
instruction 19 as that instruction expressly states that
one must knowingly participate before he may be a conspirator (249).
Instruction 16 is also erroneous in that it per1nits the
jury to speculate as to \vhat act might be one of the
qvert acts necessary to be proved in order to support a
conviction for said instruction sets out as one of the overt
acts that might be proved the following:
(5) * * *
(d) that between January 6, 1936, and January 1, 1938, the defendants permitted, allowed,
enabled and assisted a house or houses of ill fame
to operation in violation of the state statutes and
of the Ordinances of Salt Lake City.

A like paragraph is also 1nade in connection with
lotteries, boolnnaking places, dice gaines, etc.
By setting forth such alleged overt acts the jury
would be entitled to consider almost any act or acts of
anyiine· as an act which had assisted, allowed and enabled houses of ill fame and gambling places to operate.
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For instance, the jury n1ight PYPH g-o ~n t'n r n~ to ~ny that
if the evidence slHn,·ed that thPre happenPd to hP a gnntbling place operatin~ even though therP had not hPPn
brought to the attention of dPfendant~ or other partiP~
responsible for enforcing the la\\·~ nf the ~tate sutl"ieiPnt
evidence or inforn1ation to "·arrant an arre~t or tl1e filing
of so1ue charge or action, that tht'~- ,,·ould be ju~tified in
bringing in their verdict of guilty 1nerely on the conclu~ion that the defendant~ or their e1uployes ~hould haYe
done something they did not do. To allo'Y a conYiction
on such a set of facts means that one could be tri.ed on a
conspiracy and convicted on fact~ or cireu1nstances "·hich
were not considered by the grand jury nor even in the
contemplation of the district attorney during the trial of
the case. Xor 'rill the fact that the overt act of collecting
money which was alsu alleged and given in the instruction
aid the error for you would have to ~peculate as to ,,·hich
overt act the jury based its conviction.
The court erred in refusing to give defendant Erwin's requested instructions X o~. 1:1 and 22~ \Yhich instructions are as follo,Ys :
Xo. 19
You are instructed that the ,,·itness Ben HunIxsTRCCTirJX

sa~r related certain conversations 'vhich he
claimed he had with the defendant E. B. Erwin.
You· are instructed that You must not consider
any such statement alleged to have been made by
the defendant E. B. Erv{in to the witness Ben Hunsaker as in any sense being an admission of the
~aid E. ~· .Erwin th~t he was guilty of enteri~g
Into a crnninal conspiracy as alleged in the indictment or that he committed any of the overt act~
alleged in the indictment. (170 Ab. 297.)
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INSTRUCTION

No. 22

You are instructed that the witness Fisher
Harris related certain conversations which he
claimed he had "vith the defendant E. B. Erwin.
You are instructed that you must not consider
any such statement alleged to have been made by
the defendant E. B. Er\vin to the witness Fisher
Harris as in any sense being an admission by the
said E. B. Erwin that he was guilty of entering
into a criminal conspiracy as alleged in the indictnlent or that he comn1itted any of the overt acts
alleged in the indictment. ( 177 A b. 299.)
We feel that both of these instructions should have
been given and that our position is a1nply justified and
supported by the numerous authorities cited in the brief
sub1nitted by the defendants Finch and Pearce covering
'vhat has been designated therein as testimony under classification No. 2 and set forth between pages 59 and 74 in
said brief, and which authorities "\Ve hereby adopt in
this brief as if set out in full and ask that they be considered in connection with these two instructions.
IMPROPER CONDUCT OF DISTRICT ATTORNEY
BY OPENING STATEMENT
Numerous objections and exceptions were taken to
the opening statement made by Mr. Rawlings, which
statement is included in Volume consisting of 73 pages.
. To appreciate the error committed by such opening
statement it is necessary to read and analyze the entire
statement and also to fully appreciate the fact that Mr.
Rawlings had, prior to his opening statement, full knowledge of just what facts he could and could not prove.

,r
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This is true becau~e he kne"· "·hat had lwPn introduePd
before the grand jury and al~o "·hnt had takt\n pine(\ at
the prenous trial of :Mr. Er"~in and had al~o undonhh\dly
gone oYer the te~timony of tl1e "·itne~~P~ he '"as going
to call numerous time~ prior to hi~ opening ~ta te1nent
in this case.
-The purpose of an opening ~tatement is to advi~e
the jury concerning the questions of fact involved so a8
to prepare their minds for the e\idenee to be heard and
it is not and should not be permitted to beco1ne an argument. Xor should it contain a staten1ent of facts or eircumstances which he knows cannot be proved or that he
will not be allowed to prove.
People \S. ~rnold (ill.), 93 N". E. 786, \Yhere the
court in discussing an opening statement said:
The office of an opening statement is to advise the jury concerning the questions of fact involved, so as to prepare their minds for the evidence to be heard (1 Thompson on Trials 267;
Pietsch vs. Pietsch, 245 ill. 454, 92 N. E. 325),
and it is not and should not be, permitted to become an argument.
If ~Ir. Rawlings was not attempting to argue and
convince or influence the jury by his opening statement,
then the following statements should not have been made:
Right here let me call this mat~er to your
attention: It is our contention not only that these
houses and other establishments of vice, covering
book-making, card rooms, marble games, - not
only that they were tolerated, that they were
known about by these defendants, who had knowlSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library
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Technology
Act, administered
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them,
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they were perrnitted to operate, that there was a
pay-off; and a portion of the rnoney from the
pay-off given by the operators of these places went
into the hands of the defendants, in order that
these establishments rnight run, and as a protection against their being closed up and the operators and those in attendance being run out of
town.
We shall introduce evidence to show that as
soon as Mr. Erwin made the request of Mr. Earley
- I reiterate that this request came early in January of '36, when Mr. Earley was acting as the
office manager in the Public Safety Departmentthat Mr. Earley made some inquiry to determine
how much was being paid for protection. That
he deterrnined, and reported to the mayor that
there "\Vere surns aggregating approxin1ately two
thousand dollars per month being collected from
the operators of these vice institutions, including
prostitutes, operators of the houses, operators of
book-making establish1nents, operators of card
games and dice games. (Page 3 add. tr.)
I have all the confidence in the world that
this jury can determine when that evidence comes
in whether or not I am telling the truth. (Page 49
add. tr.)
In about September or October, when another
payment was made- and during the time payments were brought up to Ogden, mind you, by ~fr.
Erwin personally, and paid in cash, for which receipts were requested. In practically every instance, I think, with the exception of one, and Inaybe two, they were paid to Mr. Hunsaker or to his
wife, or in one or two instances his son, \vho will
be produced as a witness; but in each of these
instances, with the exceptions J 1nentioned, they
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''"ere paid in ca~h. la rgpr th'noininn tion~
year "rent on. \ PngP :)0 add. tr.)
No"~, a~

T indicated to y{)ll,

H:.-\

t hP

tlH'~t' paylll('n t~

"-ere all n1ade in ea~h, and "·ith the t.\~H·Pptinn of
those I have 1nentioned, the lath"r on~~ '"~rP n1arle
in pay1nents in eash in bill~ of $50.00 and $100.00.
(Page 52 add. tr.)
.And in Xovenlber-recallJHHY, thi~ i~ the tilne
that this crusade "·as on by the "-oinen ·~ club~
~ ~ ~ ~. (Page 53, add. tr.)

I call your attention to the fact that at thi!-i
first meeting no question was asked by :Jir. Er"-in
-no question asked as to who ·was 1uaking eollections. or who "-as involved. (Page 64 add. tr.)
Nor, as heretofore mentioned, ~hould counsel deliberately and knowingly make a staten1ent of a fact w·hich
he knows he cannot prove.
State

\S.

X athoo (Iow·a). 133 X. ,,-. 129:

. A.n attorney ought not to he permitted to get
a matter before the jur!r in an opening statement
which he must kno'v he 'vill not be allowed to
prove under the specious pretext that it cannot
then be said 'vhat evidence will be received.
And certainly :Jir. Ra,vlings cannot say when he
made the follo\\ting statement:
He knows what the evidence is. We vv-ill show,
in this case, that this money was turned over to
l\Ir. Erwin, but came through Jf r. Holt's hand:-;.
(Page 36 add. tr.)
that he thought the evidence would prove that money had
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been paid to 1fr. Erwin by Holt or anyone else. This is
the very thing they endeavored to prove in the previous
trial and failed and he knew he 'vould be unable to prove
it.
State vs. Distefano, 70 Utah 586, 262 Pac. 113:
In the opening statement to the jury counsel
1nay properly fully state all of the material facts
'vhich the evidence 'vill establish, but not facts
which the party is not able to prove and none that
cannot be supported by legal evidence. Bishop's
Crin1inal Procedure ( 2d Ed.) Vol. 2, Page 791 and
969.

1Trorn ~r r. Rawlings' opening staternent, only a s1nall
portion of 'vhich 've have set forth, it is apparent that
counsel did not rnerely intend to outline 'vhat ·the evidence
"\Vould probably be, but intended to paint a vivid picture
of corruption and illegality that regardless of the evidence that n1ight follow, 'vould rernain in the minds of
the jury.
Fro1n the detailed state1nent of the evidence, his argurnents \vith the court and his fight to put before the
jury his theory of the case clearly shows that counsel intended by his opening staternent to win at any cost and
've earnestly contend that such error cannot be cured h~·
any instruction the court did make.
We do not \Vaive any assign1nents of error. We adopt
the points and authorities contained in the brief filed for
:Thiessrs. Pearce and Finch so far as they are applicable
to 1\fr. Er,vin.
We respectfully subrnit that the indictment should
have been quashed. That it could not be cured by a bill
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of particulars. That the bill of parti(lula r~ ~honld haYP
been stricken. That tnt"\ eYiden(~e introdurt'd do(•s not
support the verdict of the jury. Thnt tlu.' eourt eoJnnlit.tt'd
grievous error in it~ reeeipt and exelu:..'ion ot' t'Yidt•net•.
That the instruction~ of the eourt "·ere Ini~leading· and
allowed the jury to ~peculate a~ to the outronlf' of their
deliberations and mi~instructed the jury in thP pnrticulars mentioned and contended for. That the error coinmitted by the district attorney in trying the case in the
manner in which he {lid try it depri\ed the defendant
of a fair trial.
Respectfully submitted,

B.ALL ~\XD :JIUSSER,
ED\\ARD F. RICHARDS,
...4ttorneys for Defendant

E. B. Eru·in.
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